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ABSTRACT
The individual or combined effects of climate change are likely
to trigger mass human movement both within and across international
borders. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”)
predicts that between 50 and 200 million people may be displaced by 2050.
Thus, the human impact on the environment is creating a new kind of
global casualty for the twenty-first century—an emergent class of environ-
mental migrants. The exact number of individuals cannot be predicted as
scholars and international agencies provide varying statistics depending
on underlying methods, scenarios, time frames, and assumptions. Many
authors challenge the concept of climate change as a primary cause of
forced displacement. Some authors even refute the existence of “environ-
mental migration” because of the problem of multi-causality associated
with the issue. They claim that the decision to move in most cases depends
on a combination of other complex socioeconomic factors. In this context,
this Article first examines the possible link between environmental change
and consequent human migration. It shows how the major impacts of cli-
mate change play a substantial role in triggering human migration. Then
it analyzes the types of environmental migration found in the literature
on causes and extent of movement. Providing an overview of predicted
numbers and figures of environmental migration, this Article also analyzes
debates associated with environmental migration mainly based on the
problem of multi-causality to show the diversity and complexity of issues
related to environmental migration. Finally, this Article argues for recog-
nition of and protection for migrants forced to move to safer places due to
certain direct impacts of climate change, notwithstanding the existence
of multi-causality.
* Assistant Professor, Department of Law, University of Chittagong, Bangladesh and
Ph.D. candidate, Macquarie Law School, Australia. The author can be contacted at
mnaserbd@gmail.com. I wish to thank Professor Muhammad Rafiqul Islam for comments
on an earlier draft of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
The link between climate change caused by human interferences
with the world and environmental vulnerability has now been well-
established.1 The causes of climate change and its potential impact on
many different natural and social systems have been documented in recent
scientific reports and studies.2 The individual or combined effects of climate
change are likely to trigger mass human movement both within and across
international borders.3 Thus the human impact on the environment is cre-
ating a new kind of global casualty for the twenty-first century4—an emer-
gent class of environmental migrants.5 The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”)6 has already indicated that one of the greatest
1 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 2–16 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report
/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf. [hereinafter IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS] (discussing
generally the current state of trends related to human-induced climate change).
2 See id.; CAMILLO BOANO, FORCED MIGRATION ONLINE, FMO RESEARCH GUIDE ON CLIMATE
CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT 3 (2008), available at http://www.forcedmigration.org/research
-resources/expert-guides/climate-change-and-displacement/fmo046.pdf.
3 FRANK LACZKO & CHRISTINE AGHAZARM, MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 1 (2010), available at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free
/migration_and_environment.pdf.
4 Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees, 19 POPULATION & ENV’T 167, 175 (1997) (“The
issue of environmental refugees . . . promises to rank as one of the foremost human crises
of our times.”).
5 MOLLY CONISBEE & ANDREW SIMMS, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES: THE CASE FOR
RECOGNITION 17–18 (2003), available at http://files.uniteddiversity.com/More_Books_and
_Reports/Environmental_Refugees-The_Case_for_Recognition.pdf. A note on terminology:
throughout this Article, the terms “environmental migrants,” “environmental displacement,”
“climate change migrants,” and “climate change displacements” are used interchangeably
to refer to all movements away from the usual place of residence, whether these are internal
or international, permanent or temporary, forced or voluntary.
6 The IPCC was set up jointly by the World Meteorological Organization (“WMO”) and the
United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) in 1988 to “assess on a comprehensive,
objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information
relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change,
its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.” INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC ANNIVERSARY BROCHURE: 16 YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE CLIMATE CONVENTION (2004), available at http://www
.ipcc.ch/pdf/10th-anniversary/anniversary-brochure.pdf. The IPCC is open to all members
of the WMO and UNEP and meets annually at the plenary level of government repre-
sentatives in sessions attended by officials and experts from relevant ministries, agencies,
and research institutions from member countries and from participating organizations.
Id. at 2. Its first assessment, released in 1990, was the impetus for the creation of the
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effects of climate change may be on human migration.7 The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) predicts that between 50
and 200 million people may be displaced by 2050 “either within their
countries or across borders.”8 The exact numbers of these migrants can-
not be predicted as scholars and international agencies provide varying
statistics “depending on underlying methods, scenarios, timeframes, and
assumptions.”9 Although all the current predictions are challenged by
authors as having “methodological problems and caveats,” the available
literature confirms that this potential catastrophe will exceed all instances
of “refugee crises in terms of the number of people affected.”10 Various
intergovernmental agencies such as IPCC, UNHCR,11 International
Organization for Migration (“IOM”),12 and many scholarly articles warn
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) in 1994, whose
purpose is to serve as an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to tackle the chal-
lenge posed by climate change. Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response
to Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://
unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited Mar. 16, 2012); see also
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FIRST ASSESSMENT REPORT: IPCC
OVERVIEW (1990), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20Supplement
/IPCC_1990_and_1992 _Assessments/English/ipcc_90_92_assessments_far_overview.pdf.
7 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC
IMPACTS ASSESSMENT 3, 2–22, 5-6 to 5-8 (WJ. McG. Tegart et al. eds., 1990), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_II/ipcc_far_wg_II_full_report.pdf [hereinafter IPCC
1990 IMPACTS ASSESSMENT]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 488 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm [here-
inafter IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY] (describing sea level increases);
HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, STERN REVIEW REPORT ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
111 (2006), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury
.gov.uk/d/Part_II_Introduction_group.pdf [hereinafter STERN REVIEW REPORT].
8 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, FORCED MIGRATION IN THE CONTEXT
OF CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGES FOR STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2009).
9 Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global
Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 60, 61 (2010).
10 Id. at 61, 67.
11 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established on
December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. About Us, UNHCR, http://
www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2012) (“The agency is man-
dated to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee
problems worldwide.”).
12 See About IOM, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about
-iom/lang/en (last visited Mar. 16, 2012) (“Established in 1951, IOM is the leading Inter-
governmental organization in the field of migration and works closely with governmental,
Intergovernmental and non-governmental partners.”).
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about future waves of climate change-induced forced migrants.13 With
all the dangers predicted by scientists, the issue of environment-related
migration has rarely received attention from policy makers.14 The indiffer-
ence arises, according to Frank Laczko and Christine Aghazarm, partly due
to lack of consensus among migration researchers and experts on issues
related to the nexus between environment, migration, and the concept of
environmental displacement.15 Many authors challenge the conceptualiza-
tion of climate change as a primary cause of forced displacement.16 Some
authors even refute the existence of “environmental migration” because
of the potential of multi-causality associated with the issue.17 They claim
that the decision to move in most cases depends on a combination of other
complex socioeconomic factors.18 Moreover, there is a serious dearth of
empirical research on the nexus between migration and climate change.19
As a consequence, the available predicted figures and numbers of
“environmental migration” or “climate migration” are diverse and debatable.
There is no universal definition to identify this category of human displace-
ment and so it remains difficult to estimate future trends.20 Therefore, this
category of people is still in search of recognition in international law.
Part I of this Article examines the possible link between environ-
mental change and consequent human migration. It shows how the major
impacts of climate change play a substantial role in triggering human
migration. Part II analyzes the typologies of environmental migration
found in the literature on causes and extent of movement. Part III provides
an overview of predicted numbers and figures of environmental migration.
Part IV analyzes the debates associated with environmental migration sur-
rounding the problem of multi-causality to show the diversity and complex
13 In 1992 the IOM published a report on migration and the environment in which it stated
“[l]arge numbers of people are moving as a result of environmental degradation that has
increased dramatically in recent years. The number of such migrants could rise substan-
tially as larger areas [of] the earth become uninhabitable as a result of climate change.”
INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, MIGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992), available at http://
wp.socialwatch.org/?p=130.
14 LACZKO & AGHAZARM, supra note 3, at 1.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 17.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, FORCED MIGRATION RESEARCH AND POLICY: OVERVIEW OF
CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 12 (2010), available at http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk
/pdfs/RSC-FM-policy-and-research-overview.pdf.
20 Biermann & Boas, supra note 9, at 67; SUSANA B. ADAMO, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED
POPULATION DISPLACEMENTS 15 (2009), available at http://petdb.ldeo.columbia.edu
/documents/environinduced-s.adamo-IHDPupdate-2009.pdf.
2012] CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 717
issues related with environmental migration. Finally, the conclusion argues
for the recognition of and protection for migrants forced to move to safer
places due to certain direct impacts of climate change, notwithstanding
the existence of multi-causality.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND
MIGRATION NEXUS
Human migration as a result of environmental change is not a new
phenomenon.21 People move from one place to another for many reasons.22
A range of factors motivate the migration decision, including “[e]conomics,
nationality, religion, war, ethnic hatred, and political turmoil.”23 Thus
many and varied factors trigger millions of people to leave their home for
a better lifestyle, social security, or religious tolerance.24 After the Second
World War, thousands of people migrated from one region to another in
search of food, shelter, and safety.25 However, the environment has always
been a unique triggering factor for forced displacement throughout human
history.26 Migration is considered “one of the oldest coping strategies” in
the face of life-threatening environmental crises.27 Before the Industrial
Revolution, these mass movements mainly took place due to natural en-
vironmental degradation or catastrophe, including hurricanes or storms
that caused major flooding or owing to scarcity of land resources.28 In the
twentieth century, the nature and extent of environmental migration have
substantially been changed due to environmental degradation as a result
of global climate change. Since the start of the Industrial Revolution
21 Arthur H. Westing, Environmental Refugees: A Growing Category of Displaced Persons,
19 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 201, 201 (1992); Dana Zartner Falstrom, Stemming the Flow
of Environmental Displacement: Creating a Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the
Environment, 1 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2001); LACZKO & AGHAZARM, supra
note 3, at 13.
22 See Falstrom, supra note 21, at 3.
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., id.
25 See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Williamson, Global Migration, INT’L MONETARY FUND FIN. & DEV.
(2006), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2006/09/williams.htm.
26 See LACZKO & AGHAZARM, supra note 3, at 13.
27 TINA ACKETOFT, COMM. ON MIGRATION, REFUGEES, & POPULATION, COUNCIL OF EUR.
PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT:
A 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE 2 (2008), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents
/WorkingDocs/Doc08/EDOC11785.pdf; Hermen J. Ketel, Global Warming and Human
Migration, in CLIMATE CHANGE, HUMAN SYSTEMS AND POLICY 1 (Antoaneta Yotova ed.,
2004); see also Falstrom, supra note 21, at 3.
28 Falstrom, supra note 21, at 3.
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“[e]missions of [carbon dioxide (“CO2”)], the principal greenhouse gas,
have risen more than ten-fold” and are now at a higher concentration
in the atmosphere than they have been for many thousands of years.29
Chemical analysis of the carbon particulates demonstrates that this in-
crease is due largely to the burning of fossil fuels—coal, oil and gas.30 This
burning of fossil fuels consequently damages the ecological balance of the
earth, thickening the natural greenhouse layer, which causes the warming
of the earth: a process popularly known as “global warming.”31 Due to
global warming, the physical environment is now changing in ways that
make human populations more vulnerable to environmental stress.32
Since mid-1990, after publication of the First Assessment Report
of IPCC, apart from the “tentative and theoretical” scientific reports on
the cause and effects of climate change, a growing international consensus
has developed on this issue.33 The IPCC, since its very inception, has con-
tinuously warned the international community about the potential impacts
of climate change on many different natural and social systems.34 According
29 SUDHIR CHELLA RAJAN, CLIMATE MIGRANTS IN SOUTH ASIA: ESTIMATES AND SOLUTIONS—
A REPORT BY GREENPEACE 2 (2008).
30 See id.; IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 1, at 2.
31 See, e.g., Nat’l Aeronautical & Space Admin., Global Warming, EARTH OBSERVATORY,
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/GlobalWarming/page2.php (last visited Mar. 16,
2012).
32 See BOANO, supra note 2, at 3.
33 Sara C. Aminzadeh, A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of Climate
Change, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 231, 233 (2007). This issue has become the
most popular, and perhaps most discussed, international agenda as a result of the growing
awareness of the reality of climate change and its possible implications. United Nations
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon singled out climate change as the greatest challenge facing
the world during his keynote speech to the World Federation of United Nations Associations.
Jeremy Hance, Ban Ki-Moon: Climate Change ‘Greatest Collective Challenge We Face,’
MONGABAY (Aug. 10, 2009), http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0810-hance_un_climate.html
(“We have less than 10 years to halt the global rise in greenhouse gas emissions if we are
to avoid catastrophic consequences for people and the planet. It is, simply, the greatest col-
lective challenge we face as a human family.”). President Barack Obama also addressed the
seriousness of the climate change dilemma in a speech at a United Nations Climate Change
Summit. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the United Nations Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon’s Climate Change Summit (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-UN-Secretary-General-Ban-Ki-moons
-Climate-Change-Summit (“That so many of us are here today is a recognition that the
threat from climate change is serious, it is urgent, and it is growing. Our generation’s re-
sponse to this challenge will be judged by history, for if we fail to meet it—boldly, swiftly,
and together—we risk consigning future generations to an irreversible catastrophe.”).
34 The IPCC has already published four assessment reports to date. The fifth assessment
report committee has recently started its work. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
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to the IPCC, climate change, altering the atmosphere and the global envi-
ronment through anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, is changing the
physical environment in ways that make human populations more vul-
nerable to environmental stress.35 In the latest Fourth Assessment Report
in 2007, the IPCC calls human-induced climate change “unequivocal”
and authoritatively establishes that it is accelerating and already has
had severe impacts on the environment and the deterioration of living
conditions of human beings in many parts of the world, bearing great
stress on ecosystems, socioeconomic systems, and human welfare.36 “There
is a growing consensus between researchers and politicians that the nega-
tive impacts of climate change” will increase the risk of environmental
vulnerability.37 Manifestations of climate change are numerous and include
rising sea levels, increasing global warming, glacier melting, multiplication
of extreme weather events such as storms, cyclones, and droughts, deserti-
fication, scarcity of water resources, and depletion of natural resources
due to more frequent and severe climatic disasters.38 Natural disasters39
and calamities have already increased in many parts of the world in terms
of frequency, intensity, and severity, which have no precedent in human
35 See generally IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 1, at 2–16; INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 9,
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf [hereinafter
IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (WG-II)].
36 See IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 1, at 5, 9; see also BOANO, supra
note 2, at 3; MARCOS A. ORELLANA, PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS
AND CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY 8 (2009).
37 Walter Kälin, Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally
Displaced Persons and Co-Director, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, The
Climate Change—Displacement Nexus (July 16, 2008) (speech delivered at the ECOSOC
Panel on Disaster Risk Reduction and Preparedness: Addressing the Humanitarian
Consequences of Natural Disasters).
38 See IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (WG-II), supra note 35, at 9, 14; JAMES
MORRISSEY, REFUGEE STUDIES CTR., ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION:
A STATE OF THE ART REVIEW 28 (2009); Robert Stojanov, Environmental Refugees—
Introduction, 38 GEOGRAPHICA 77, 78–80 (2004); Orellana, supra note 36, at 8.
39 The International Disaster Response Law Guidelines put forward by the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (“IFRC”) defines a disaster as “a
serious disruption of the functioning of society, which poses a significant, widespread threat
to human life, health, property or the environment, whether arising from accident, nature
or human activity, whether developing suddenly or as the result of long-term processes,
but excluding armed conflict.” INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOC’YS,
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE LAW GUIDELINES 14 (2011), available at http://www
.ifrc.org//PageFiles/41203/1205600-IDRL%20Guidelines-EN-LR%20(2).pdf.
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history.40 According to an IOM report on migration, environment, and
climate change, the number of recorded natural disasters including storms,
floods, and drought have increased more than threefold over the past
thirty years.41 For example, “there has been an increase in the reporting
of natural disasters, from 100 in 1974 to 400 in 2003.”42 Along with the
higher frequency, the intensity and severity of climate related disasters
have also increased.43
Apart from the ecological effects, the human dimensions of climate
change are huge and multifarious.44 One of the most important implications
is potential mass human displacement—either within states or across inter-
national borders due to increased vulnerability arising from the impacts
of climate change.45 These direct effects of climate change undermine the
viability of ecosystem-dependent livelihoods (such as rained agriculture,
herding, and fishing) and impact people’s ability to subsist in certain parts
of the world.46 Moreover, the loss of livelihoods and living spaces as a re-
sult of environmental stress exacerbate the vulnerability of people already
on the brink of disaster.47
40 See, e.g., Falstrom, supra note 21, at 3; VIKRAM KOLMANNSKOG, NORWEGIAN REFUGEE
COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE, DISASTER, DISPLACEMENT AND MIGRATION: INITIAL EVIDENCE
FROM AFRICA 2 (2009), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4b18e3599.html. Now natural
disasters are “more intense and frequent and the human impacts are more devastating.”
Climate Change Could Become the Biggest Driver of Displacement: UNHCR Chief, UNHCR
(Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/4b2910239.html [hereinafter Climate Change Could
Become the Biggest Driver of Displacement] (quoting United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees António Guterres’s remarks at a press conference at the United Nations
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark).
41 LACZKO & AGHAZARM, supra note 3, at 259.
42 Id.
43 KOLMANNSKOG, supra note 40, at 2; see also Climate Change Could Become the Biggest
Driver of Displacement, supra note 40.
44 See, e.g., DAVID CORLETT, STORMY WEATHER: THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND
DISPLACEMENT 14 (2008).
45 See, e.g., BOANO, supra note 2, at 3; KOKO WARNER, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER: MAPPING THE
EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON HUMAN MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT 1 (2009) [here-
inafter WARNER, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER]; Rex Victor Cruz et al., Asia, in IPCC, IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 7, at 484, 488; W. Neil Adger et al., Assessment
of Adaptation Practices, Options, Constraints and Capacity, in IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION
AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 7, at 733–34; Robert J. Nicholls & Richard S. J. Tol,
Impacts and Responses to Sea-Level Rise: A Global Analysis of the SRES Scenarios Over
the Twenty-First Century, 364 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y 1073, 1074 (2006);
Biermann & Boas, supra note 9, at 61; STERN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 111.
46 See Falstrom, supra note 21, at 3; WARNER, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER, supra note 45, at 3.
47 See WARNER, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER, supra note 45, at 3.
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Displacement can occur due to various combinations of environ-
mental factors. Specifically, global warming, rising sea level, glacier melt-
ing, floods, drought, and desertification are the most important drivers for
this movement.48 Sir Nicholas Stern warned in the review of the economic
consequences of global warming delivered to the British Government in
November 2006 that “greater resource scarcity, desertification, risks of
droughts and floods, and rising sea levels could drive many millions of
people to migrate.”49
In 1992, at the UN Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees noted that
“more and more people are being forced to flee for a com-
plex combination of reasons, linked as much to population
growth, poverty, famine and environmental degradation
as to mass violations of human rights, social and ethnic
tensions and armed conflict. . . . This relationship between
refugees and the environment has long been overlooked.”50
Recently, in 2008, the UNHCR chief also identified environmental im-
pacts of climate change as the key driver of forced displacement in the
near future.51 Thus, environmental migration appears to be a rapidly grow-
ing form of forced displacement that will continue to affect the world in
future decades.52
Before environment can be considered a major cause of population
movements, it is essential to develop an improved understanding of what
is meant by “environmental degradation,” and more specifically how the
impacts of climate change directly cause human displacement. Research
on global climate change suggests certain types of environmental change
through which people are commonly displaced out of their current habitat.53
48 Falstrom, supra note 21, at 3.
49 STERN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 111.
50 See Brooke Havard, Comment, Seeking Protection: Recognition of Environmentally
Displaced Persons Under International Human Rights Law, 18 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 65, 78
(2007) (quoting United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata’s statement
at the UN Conference on Environment and Development).
51 Julian Borger, Conflicts Fueled by Climate Change Causing New Refugee Crisis, Warns
UN, GUARDIAN (June 16, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jun/17/climate
change.food (quoting United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres).
52 See Graeme Hugo, Environmental Concerns and International Migration, 30 INT’L
MIGRATION REV. 105, 117 (1996); Aminzadeh, supra note 33, at 256.
53 Angela Williams, Promoting Justice Within the International Legal System: Prospects
for Climate Refugees, in CLIMATE LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LEGAL AND POLICY
CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 85 (Benjamin J. Richardson et al. eds., 2009).
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The latest report of the IPCC also enumerates most threatening poten-
tial causes of migrations in this century.54 According to IPCC, the drivers
of such movement principally include: global warming; the inundation of
settled land due to sea level rise; melting glaciers; accelerated drought,
desertification and scarcity of water resources; and depletion of natural
resources due to more frequent and severe climatic disasters.55 Thus the
impacts of climate change have an effect on human life that has direct
influence on displacement of people in many and varied ways.56
A. Global Warming
“The foremost evidence for worldwide climate change has been
global warming.”57 It is one of the most important factors contributing to
environmental degradation and disasters.58 Evidence indicates that the
Earth’s climate system is warming in a way that has no precedent in the
history of human civilization.59 The continuing temperature acceleration
“might break the balance of a human ecosystem that has been long estab-
lished at a lower temperature.”60 The latest report of the IPCC estimates
a rise in the global average surface temperature from 1990 to 2100 of
between 1.8° C and 4° C, although it could possibly be as high as 6.4° C.61
The sea level has risen between 1993 and 2003 at a rate of 3.1 milli-
meters per year due to melting polar ice caps and seawater expansion (due
to warmer climate); rainfall patterns have been changing with increased
droughts in some areas and heavier rain in others; glaciers and snow melt-
ing have been increasing water in rivers at certain times; winds are in-
creasing in power and cyclones are shown to be increasing in frequency;
and ocean temperatures have been rising.62
Global warming is likely to influence the average weather patterns
by gradual changes in average weather patterns and “increased variability
54 IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (WG-II), supra note 35, at 18.
55 Id.
56 Williams, supra note 53, at 84.
57 JAMES S. PENDER, WHAT IS CLIMATE CHANGE? AND HOW IT WILL EFFECT BANGLADESH
11 (2008).
58 See IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 1.
59 See id.; STERN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
60 David D. Zhang et al., Global Climate Change, War, and Population Decline in Recent
Human History, 104 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 19214, 19219
(2007).
61 See IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 1, at 13.
62 See Nathaniel L. Bindoff et al., Observations: Oceanic Climate Change and Sea Level,
in IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 7, at 387.
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of extreme weather events associated with changes in surface temperature
and precipitation.”63 In the last few decades, ninety percent of natural di-
sasters have been caused by climate-related natural hazards; and there is
scientific evidence that most of them have their roots in global warming.64
The effects of warming and drying in some regions will reduce agriculture
potential and undermine “ecosystem services” such as clean water and fer-
tile soil.65 Thus, the environmental impacts as a result of global warming
have a deleterious effect on the living environment of large populations,
which ultimately leads to mass migration.66
B. Sea Level Rise
Rising sea levels have the potential to cause considerable displace-
ment, as the phenomenon is virtually irreversible and manifests itself over
a long period of time.67 According to the latest information from the IPCC,
global sea levels will rise by at least eighteen centimeters, but in the worst
case scenario it could be as much as fifty-nine centimeters by the year
2100.68 Recent scientific analysis indicates that this figure could be closer
to 150 centimeters within the same time frame.69 The Garnaut Review
noted that “[s]ome of the recent scientific work suggests that future sea-
level rise could be much worse than the sea-level rise outcomes projected
in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report.”70 An estimated forty-four percent
of the world’s population lives within 150 kilometers of the sea coast.71
The rising sea level is likely to have an impact on salt water intrusion,
inundation, coastal erosion, more destructive storms, and decreased fresh-
water ability.72 Consequently, there is strong evidence that all of these
63 BOANO, supra note 2, at 16.
64 See id.; Ketel, supra note 27, at 1.
65 See BOANO, supra note 2, at 16.
66 See id.; Ketel, supra note 27, at 1.
67 See ETIENNE PIGUET, CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION 7 (2008); Angela Williams,
Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law, 30 L. &
POL’Y 502, 504–06 (2008) (calling for regional efforts under the UNFCCC umbrella).
68 See IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 1, at 13.
69 Richard Black, Forecast for Big Sea Level Rise, BBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2008), http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7349236.stm.
70 ROSS GARNAUT, THE GARNAUT CLIMATE CHANGE REVIEW: FINAL REPORT 94 (2008).
71 INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, NO. 10, INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON MIGRATION, EXPERT
SEMINAR: MIGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 26 (2008).
72 WARNER, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER, supra note 45, at iv; Derek R. Bell, Environmental
Refugees: What Rights? Which Duties?, 10 RES PUBLICA 135, 135 (2004); Andrew Morton
et al., Human Security Policy Challenges, 31 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 5, 5–6 (2008).
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impacts of sea level rise threaten to undermine crop growth, destroy
subsistence food resources and water supplies, vital infrastructure, and
inundate low-lying coastal areas that are home to millions of people.73
Many atolls may even completely disappear or become uninhabitable dur-
ing this century if rates of sea level rise accelerate.74 Several small island
state nations including the Maldives in the Indian Ocean and the Marshall
Islands and Tuvalu in the Pacific are at serious risk of complete destruc-
tion by the end of this century.75 Papua New Guinea’s Carteret Islands are
among the most affected islands in the Pacific and “may be completely
submerged by as early as 2015” by rising seas.76 In 2005, the government
evacuated the 2600 Carteret islanders in response to the ever-rising sea
levels and resettled them on the larger Bougainville Island.77
However, “the predicted rise in sea level does not only threaten
small island states,” some developing countries are also especially vulner-
able to sea level rise due to their low-lying nature and limited financial re-
sources to respond.78 “[T]he threat is even more pronounced in regions with
high population density” in deltaic coastal regions, such as Bangladesh,
Vietnam, China, the Philippines, Indonesia, the Maldives, the Marshall
Islands, and Egypt.79 For example, “[t]he Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna
73 WARNER, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER, supra note 45, at iv; Bell, supra note 72, at 135;
Morton et al., supra note 72, at 5–6.
74 See Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a
Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 355–56 (2009); N.W.
Arnell et al., The Consequences of CO2 Stabilization for the Impacts of Climate Change, 53
CLIMATIC CHANGE 430, 431–32 (2002); Bell, supra note 72, at 135–36; Robert J. Nicholls
et al., Increasing Flood Risk and Wetland Losses Due to Global Sea-Level Rise: Regional
and Global Analyses, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 81, 81 (1999); Jane McAdam & Ben Saul,
An Insecure Climate for Human Security? Climate-Induced Displacement and International
Law 3 (Sydney Centre for International Law, Sydney Centre, Working Paper No. 4, 2008),
available at http://sydney.edu.au/law/scil/documents/2009/SCILWP4_Final.pdf.
75 See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 74, at 355–56.
76 Int’l Org. for Migration, Migration, Climate Change and the Environment 4 (IOM Policy
Brief, 2009).
77 Id.
78 Williams, supra note 67, at 505.
79 Id. Two populous island nations, the Philippines and Indonesia, have millions who face
displacement from their homes as sea levels rise. Id.; Svitlana Kravchenko, Right to Carbon
or Right to Life: Human Rights Approaches to Climate Change, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 513,
527 (2008). Several small island state nations including the Maldives in the Indian Ocean
and the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu in the Pacific could face destruction within this
century if rates of sea level rise accelerate. Docherty & Gianni, supra note 74, at 355–56.
GermanWatch, in its recent report, found that Bangladesh is the coastal country most
vulnerable to climate change. G. M. Mourtoza, GermanWatch Finds Bangladesh Most
Vulnerable to Climate, CLIMATE CHANGE MEDIA PARTNERSHIP (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www
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river delta, which stretches from India and Bangladesh, to Nepal, China,
and Bhutan, is home to approximately 129 million people.”80 Bangladesh,
one of the poorest countries in the world, has a large population “near sea
level who are vulnerable to rising seas and stronger storms.”81 According
to an IOM report, “a rise in sea level of 10 centimetres could result in the
flooding of most of Bangladesh.”82 Due to salt contamination as a result of
sea level rise, the fertile agricultural land, previously used for producing
rice and essential foods, now has been replaced with export-based shrimp
farms that affect the supply of nutrition and employment of local people.83
Two populous island states, the Philippines and Indonesia, also have mil-
lions of people who face displacement from their homes from sea level rise.84
Thus, sea level rise will possibly motivate resettlement, forced mi-
gration, or other forms of human mobility.85 The IPCC notes that “migra-
tion is the only option in response to sea-level rise that inundates islands
and coastal settlements.”86 People living in the coastal areas of developing
countries are mostly affected by storm surges and flooding because of sea
level rise.87 Flooding “already affects around 46 million people a year . . .
[b]ut with a 50 cm sea-level rise, this figure could double to 92 million.”88
C. Flood
Flood has been a known and common natural hazard throughout
human history.89 The risk, magnitude, and frequency of floods are likely
.climatemediapartnership.org/reporting/stories/germanwatch-finds-bangladesh-most
-vulnerable-to-climate/.
80 Williams, supra note 67, at 505.
81 Kravchenko, supra note 79, at 527.
82 INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 71, at 26.
83 Donatien Garnier, Bangladesh’s Climate Refugees, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, May 1, 2007;
Ann McFerran, Bangladesh: A Nation in Fear of Drowning, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 18, 2007.
84 THE GLOBAL MECHANISM, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION,
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS: SOUTH EAST ASIA 2 (2009).
85 Gordon McGranahan et al., The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate Change
and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones, 19 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 17,
17–18 (2007).
86 Rex Victor Cruz et al., Asia, in IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra
note 7, at 492. It has been argued that although adaptation to five meters of sea level rise
is technically possible, a lack of resources means that realistically this is outside the scope
of adaptation for many vulnerable states. Richard S. J. Tol et al., Adaptation to Five Metres
of Sea Level Rise, 9 J. RISK RES. 467, 467 (2006).
87 PENDER, supra note 57, at 15.
88 Id.
89 See Sabine L. Perch-Nielsen et al., Exploring the Link Between Climate Change and
Migration, 91 CLIMATIC CHANGE 375, 377 (2008).
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to increase due to increased precipitation, melting glaciers, and defores-
tation as a result of global climate change in many parts of the world.90
“Up to 20% of the world’s population live in river basins that are likely to
be affected by increased flood hazard by the 2080s.”91 “Indeed, it is esti-
mated that by 2025 over half of all people living in developing countries
will be highly vulnerable to floods and storms.”92 The possible result of
flooding from sea level rise is global and massive displacement.93 Accord-
ing to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, more than 100 million
people will be displaced each year by flooding even when the sea level
has risen by only forty centimeters.94 Even a seemingly minimal increase
in global temperatures by three to four degrees Celsius could expose an
additional 170 million people per year to coastal flooding.95 “Millions more
people risk facing annual floods due to sea-level rise by the 2080s, mostly
in the mega-deltas of Asia and Africa.”96 Floods in coastal Bangladesh and
India, for example, are expected to affect several million people, leading
to mass displacement.97
Floods cause displacement “in a simple manner.”98 Floods damage
and destroy land, houses, infrastructure, and other tangible goods and
assets.99 The loss of standing crops causes a serious decline in income for a
family dependent on agriculture.100 Moreover, a landowner whose crops are
damaged no longer needs labor for agricultural works.101 Consequently, the
inability to work, arising from injury or redundancy, seriously threatens
90 CLIONADH RALEIGH ET AL., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON MIGRATION
AND CONFLICT 6 (2008).
91 See Nigel Arnell et al., Freshwater Resources and Their Management, in IPCC: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 7, at 323, 334.
92 SARAH LA TROBE, CLIMATE AND POVERTY 12 (2002); see also ANDREW SIMMS ET AL., UP
IN SMOKE? THREATS FROM, AND RESPONSES TO, THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL WARMING ON HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 18 (2004).
93 Kravchenko, supra note 79, at 527.
94 See Nicholls et al., Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas, in IPCC: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION
AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 7, at 334.
95 CAMILLO BOANO ET AL., ENVIRONMENTALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE: UNDERSTANDING THE
LINKAGES BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, LIVELIHOODS AND FORCED MIGRATION 15
(2008); ROBERT BREARS, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES FROM THE MALDIVES: ARE THEY
PROTECTED? 2 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438822.
96 KATE RAWORTH, OXFAM INT’L, CLIMATE WRONGS AND HUMAN RIGHTS tbl.2 (2008),
available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/climate_change/downloads/bp117
_climatewrongs.pdf.
97 See Williams, supra note 67, at 505.
98 Perch-Nielsen et al., supra note 89, at 377.
99 Id. at 378.
100 Id. at 379.
101 Id.
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the livelihood of many families dependent on agriculture.102 Besides loss
of income and direct injury, “flooding can indirectly take a heavy toll on
human health by bringing about a sharp increase in diseases. . . . Inju-
ries and diseases can render people unable to work long after the floods
have subsided.”103
D. Glacier Melt
In addition to the previously discussed issues of sea level rise and
flooding, climate change will have serious deleterious repercussions for
people for whom glacial meltwater is indispensable to maintain supplies
during the dry season.104 Water volumes stored in glaciers and snow cover
are very likely to decline, reducing summer and autumn flows.105 More-
over, “the melting of glaciers in mountain regions results in huge unstable
lakes.”106 Consequently, the glacier retreat, decreasing the supply of fresh
water, threatens the existence of lower-lying communities dependent on
glacial melt for their livelihoods.107 All told, up to one billion people in Asia
alone (more than one sixth of the world’s population) could be affected by
reduced water flow from mountain glaciers.108
Most of the largest rivers in Asia including the Ganges, which
provides water to around 500 million people, survive on meltwater from
glaciers in the Himalaya–Hindu Kush region.109 “In China, 23% of the pop-
ulation (250 million people) lives in the western region that depends prin-
cipally on glacier meltwater.”110 The recent increase in the frequency of
glacial lake flooding, particularly in the Himalayan region, has caused
extensive fatalities, property damage, and the destruction of forests, farms,
and mountain infrastructure in downstream areas.111 Thus glacier melts
have been directly linked to environmental migration in Asia.112
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 STERN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 63.
105 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER
127 (Bryson Bates et al., eds., 2008).
106 Williams, supra note 67, at 505–06.
107 See IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 1, at 5–7.
108 RAWORTH, supra note 96, at 3 tbl.1.
109 STERN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 63.
110 Id.
111 See Richard Kattelmann, Glacial Lake Outburst Floods in the Nepal Himalaya: A
Manageable Hazard?, 28 NAT. HAZARDS 145, 146–49 (2003).
112 See, e.g., Shahid Husain, Nearly 15 Million Environmental Refugees Likely, THE NEWS
(Pak.), Dec. 30, 2008, available at http://climateark.org/shared/reader/welcome.aspx
?linkid=114286&keybold=water%20AND%20%20scarcity%20AND%20%20Asia.
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Over the past thirty years, nearly twenty-five percent of the area
once covered by glaciers has melted in the Andes in South America.113
“Some small glaciers are likely to disappear completely in the next decade
given current trends.”114 Many large cities such as La Paz, Lima, and Quito,
and approximately forty percent of the Andean Valley agriculture depend
on glacial meltwater supplies.115 As a result, when the dry season arrives,
up to fifty million people in the area surrounding the Andes will be affected
by loss of glacial meltwater.116 The Inuit communities in North America
and Greenland also fear displacement as mountain glaciers continue to
melt at an unprecedented rate.117 In such situations the only viable option
that remains for them is “forced relocation” to safer areas.118
E. Drought, Desertification, and Water Scarcity
Drought and water scarcity is the third main climate change impact
that may significantly contribute to climate-related migration. Droughts,
desertification, and water scarcity are likely to increase because of global
warming.119 These phenomena are projected to affect about one-third of the
world’s current population.120 Droughts are likely to displace millions of
people all over the world, affecting food insecurity and human livelihoods.121
Sea level rise will extend areas of salinization of groundwater and estu-
aries, resulting in a decrease in freshwater availability for humans and
ecosystems in coastal areas.122 Moreover, changing precipitation patterns
create pressures on the availability of clean water supplies.123
113 STERN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 63.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 64.
116 Id. at 64, 105.
117 McAdam & Saul, supra note 74, at 3.
118 Williams, supra note 67, at 506.
119 Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global
Protocol, ENVIRONMENT (Dec. 2008), http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back
Issues/November-December 2008/Biermann-Boas-full.html.
120 Janos Bogardi & Koko Warner, Here Comes the Flood, NATURE REP. CLIMATE CHANGE
(Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.nature.com/climate/2009/0901/full/climate.2008.138.html.
121 MICHELLE LEIGHTON, CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: KEY ISSUES FOR LEGAL
PROTECTION OF MIGRANTS AND DISPLACED PERSONS 1 (2010), available at http://www
.scribd.com/doc/33894001/Climate-Change-and-Migration-Key-Issues-for-Legal-Protection
-of-Migrants-and-Displaced-Persons.
122 See Nicholls et al., Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas, in IPCC: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION
AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 7, at 335.
123 See Williams, supra note 53, at 85.
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People living in Asia and Africa are most likely to be impacted by
drought and water scarcity.124 “Changes in precipitation patterns and the
disappearance of glaciers are projected to significantly affect water avail-
ability for human consumption and . . . agriculture.”125 Hundreds of mil-
lions of people who depend on glacier melt for their water supply could
experience severe water stress as “[w]ater availability will be reduced in
certain areas, especially the Mediterranean and Middle East, Southern
Africa and Latin America.”126 Assuming even low population growth, some
studies predict that a temperature increase of two degrees Celsius could
cause water resource-related suffering for between 800 and 1800 million
people, mostly in Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America.127 For instance,
growing scarcity of water resources may affect the livelihood of people
living downstream of the Himalaya–Hindu Kush mountain ranges—a
region that encompasses approximately fifty to sixty percent of the world’s
population.128 It is estimated that by the year 2020, between 75 and 250
million people in Africa are likely to face increased drought based on global
warming and its effects.129 The latest report of the IPCC also predicts in-
creased water shortages in Africa for between 74 and 250 million people
affected by 2020, and further states that in Asia:
[f]reshwater availability in Central, South, East and South-
East Asia, particularly in large river basins, is projected to
decrease due to climate change which, along with population
growth and increasing demand arising from higher stan-
dards of living, could adversely affect more than a billion
people by the 2050s.130
124 Docherty & Giannini, supra note 74, at 355. See generally KOLMANNSKOG, supra note
40 (discussing several African nations as case studies).
125 IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (WG-II), supra note 35, at 14.
126 Kälin, supra note 37, at 1; see also T. P. Barnett et al., Potential Impacts of a Warming
Climate on Water Availability in Snow-Dominated Regions, 438 NATURE 303 (2005).
127 Rachel Warren et al., Understanding the Regional Impacts of Climate Change: Research
Report Prepared for the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change 16 (2006). For
more estimates on the number of people at risk of hunger caused by drought in developing
countries, see IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 7, at 299, tbl.5.6.
128 See Barnett et al., supra note 126, at 306.
129 Purple Romero, Wealthy Nations’ Failure to Mitigate Climate Change Violates Rights
in Developing Countries, ABS-CBNNEWS (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.abs-cbnnews.com
/special-report/09/15/08/wealthy-nations%E2%80%99-failure-mitigate-climate-change
-violates-rights-developing-.
130 IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (WG-II), supra note 35, at 13.
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Desertification has been recognized as one of the major causes of
displacement and migration.131 It gradually diminishes productivity of land,
affects livelihood, and thus compels people to move to other areas once their
land becomes uninhabitable.132 Increased desertification threatens to trig-
ger almost 135 million human displacements.133
F. Extreme Weather Events: Storms, Hurricanes, and Cyclones
Climate change is likely to “increas[e] the frequency and severity
of natural disasters, particularly hydrometeorological events.”134 The in-
creased prevalence of extreme weather patterns will have deleterious
effects, potentially displacing millions of people in many areas around the
world.135 The impacts of hurricanes and cyclones manifest in population
displacement “in a brutal and direct manner.”136 However, while other
effects of climate change may be more predictable, scientists are still un-
sure of how climate change may affect cyclone activity, but “available
estimates point to a 5–10% increase in peak intensities and a 20–30% in-
crease in precipitation rates.”137 The IPCC found observational evidence
that intense tropical cyclone activity in the North Atlantic had increased
since about 1970 and states that “it is likely that future tropical cyclones
(typhoons and hurricanes) will become more intense, with larger peak wind
speeds and more heavy precipitation associated with ongoing increases of
tropical sea surface temperatures.”138
G. Depletion of Natural Resources Due to Frequent and Severe
Natural Disasters
The changing climate is likely to decrease the arable land that is able
to be utilized for agriculture as well as the length of the growing season.139
131 See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 74, at 352.
132 See id.
133 See Myers, supra note 4, at 168.
134 Elizabeth Ferris, Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Brookings-Bern Project on International
Displacement, Making Sense of Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and Displacement: A
Work in Progress (Dec. 14, 2007).
135 See Williams, supra note 53, at 85–86.
136 PIGUET, supra note 67, at 5.
137 RALEIGH ET AL., supra note 90, at 7.
138 See IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 1, at 15.
139 BOANO ET AL., supra note 95, at 14.
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The 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report warns that agricultural pro-
duction will be severely compromised by climate variability and change.140
Many plant and animal species are extremely vulnerable and in “immedi-
ate danger of extinction” mainly due to the impacts of climate change.141
“The extinction of plant and animal species is getting faster with 11% of
the world’s species of birds, 25% of its species of mammal, and around 34%
of its fish species” in danger of becoming extinct.142 If the average global
temperature increases more than 1.5 to 2.5 degrees Celsius, there will be
an even further increased risk of extinction for approximately twenty to
thirty percent of plant and animal species assessed.143 “Coral bleaching
and coastal erosion will affect fish stocks—currently the primary source
of animal protein for one billion people.”144 Local extinctions of particular
fish species are expected at edges of ranges.145 The degradation of crop
production due to coastal erosion, salt contamination, and destruction of
stocks of natural marine resources as a result of coral bleaching, put
stress on food security, which ultimately causes displacement.146
Thus, the scientific evidence clearly establishes that climate
change is real and it can generate considerable migration flows all over
the world by increasing the intensity of tropical cyclones and other natural
disasters.147 The international community is coming to recognize the im-
minent danger of climate change-related displacement of hundreds of mil-
lions of people.148 Human migration, forced or otherwise, will undoubtedly
be one of the most significant consequences of environmental degradation
and climate change in decades to come.149 Scientists and experts confirm
that large numbers of people have already been displaced due to the im-
pacts of climate change. With the development of climate change, millions
140 See IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (WG-II), supra note 35, at 13–14.
141 See PENDER, supra note 57, at 17.
142 Id.
143 See IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (WG-II), supra note 35, at 11.
144 Romero, supra note 129. This accounts for approximately one-sixth of the world’s
population. See STERN REVIEW, supra note 7, at 72.
145 See IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (WG-II), supra note 35, at 12.
146 Williams, supra note 53, at 85.
147 See Meinhard Doelle, Climate Change and Human Rights: The Role of the International
Human Rights in Motivating States to Take Climate Change Seriously, 1 MACQUARIE J.
INT’L COMP. ENVTL. L. 179, 179 (2004); PIGUET, supra note 67, at 8.
148 See Morton et al., supra note 72, at 5–7 (discussing the international response to climate
change). As early as 1990 the IPCC argued that “the greatest single impact of climate change
could be on human migration.” OLI BROWN, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, MIGRATION AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 11 (2008).
149 See, e.g., Morton et al., supra note 72, at 6.
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more people are projected to be displaced in the near future.150 Summing
up just a few of the possible effects of climate change, some twenty-five
million people will be threatened by coastal flooding, 180 to 250 million
by malaria, and 200 to 300 million by water shortages by middle of the
century.151 The melting or collapse of ice sheets alone threatens the homes
of nearly one in every twenty people.152 Increased desertification and the
alteration of ecosystems, by endangering communities’ livelihoods, are
also likely to trigger large population displacements.153 While predictions
of the potential scale of displacement are fraught with difficulties, current
estimates point to between 200 million and one billion people who may
face the loss of home, land, and livelihood in the twenty-first century due
to rising sea levels, floods, droughts, famine, and hurricanes.154
II. TYPOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL/CLIMATE CHANGE MIGRATION
The existing migration literature describes a wide variety of typol-
ogies for environmental migration based on “the relative permanency of
the move, the distance traversed, the nature of the boundaries crossed,
the causes of the move, [and] the characteristics of the movers.”155 For
example, IOM draws an overall distinction between “natural” and “man-
made” causes of environmental displacement.156 On the other hand, Refugee
Policy Group (“RPG”) draws distinctions between “emergency vs. slow-
onset movements, temporary, extended and permanent movements, and
internal and international movements.”157 The environmental displacement
can be categorized based on two interrelated factors: the nature of environ-
mental disasters and the extent of movement.158 First, the movement may
be caused by progressive changes in the environment that take effect slowly
150 Achim Steiner, Foreword, 31 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 4 (2008).
151 Martin Parry et al., Millions at Risk: Defining Critical Climate Change Threats and
Targets, 11 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 181, 182 (2001).
152 See STERN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 57 tbl.3.1.
153 See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 148, at 33.
154 See STERN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 56, 77; CHRISTIAN AID, HUMAN TIDE: THE
REAL MIGRATION CRISIS 5 (2007).
155 Hugo, supra note 52, at 106.
156 See INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENTALLY-INDUCED POPULATION DISPLACEMENTS
AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS RESULTING FROM MASS MIGRATION 14 (1996).
157 Richard Black, Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality? 2 (United Nations High
Comm’r for Refugees, Working Paper No. 34, 2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org
/research/RESEARCH/3ae6a0d00.pdf.
158 Tracey King, Environmental Displacement: Coordinating Efforts to Find Solutions, 18
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 543, 546 (2005).
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and gradually for a long time, or movement may result from sudden acute
disasters.159 Second, movement may be temporary, with the possibility of
return, or permanent, without possibility of return.160
A. Typology of Environmental Migration Based on Cause
of Movement
Essam El-Hinnawi of UNEP, the first author to bring attention
to the issue of environmental migration, identified three broad categories
of environmental displacement, namely (1) people temporarily displaced
due to natural hazards, whether natural or anthropogenic, who return to
their habitat when the environmental disruption has ended and the area
has been rehabilitated (migration primarily caused by natural disasters);
(2) people permanently displaced due to drastic and marked environmental
disruptions, such as the construction of dams (primarily as a result of devel-
opment projects); and (3) people displaced, temporarily or permanently,
due to progressive or gradual deterioration of environmental conditions,
who left their home in search of a better quality of life.161 As an additional
but smaller category, he included those people who were displaced by the
destruction of their environment as an act of warfare.162 Jodi L. Jacobson
broadened the definition and typology described by El-Hinnawi to include
persons displaced by development projects (such as the Three Gorges Dam)
or industrial accidents (such as Bhopal and Chernobyl).163 She identifies
different types of environmental refugees:
• “those displaced temporarily because of a local dis-
ruption such as an avalanche or earthquake;”164
• “those who migrate because environmental degra-
dation has undermined their livelihood or poses un-
acceptable risks to health;”165 and
• “those who resettle because land degradation has
resulted in desertification or because of other per-
manent and untenable changes in their habitat.”166
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 ESSAM EL-HINNAWI, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES 4–5 (1985).
162 Id. at 38.
163 JODI L. JACOBSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES: A YARDSTICK OF HABITABILITY 37 (1988).
164 Id. at 37–38.
165 Id. at 38.
166 Id.
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Fabrice Renaud, Janos J. Bogardi, Olivia Dun, and Koko Warner
offer the most useful typology, providing three different categories for
environmentally related mass movement,167 namely:
• “[e]nvironmentally motivated migrants” who “may
leave a steadily deteriorating environment in order
to pre-empt the worse;”168
• “[e]nvironmentally forced migrants” who “have to
leave in order to avoid the worst;”169 and
• “[e]nvironmental refugees” who must flee immedi-
ately in response to natural disasters such as flood
or hurricane.170
Steve Lonergan also notes that five groups of factors can be singled
out as environmental push elements that might lead to migration, namely:
(1) natural disasters; (2) development projects that involve changes to the
environment; (3) progressive evolution of the environment; (4) industrial
accidents; and (5) environmental consequences due to armed conflicts.171
Walter Kälin, Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, urges “a thorough analysis
of the different contexts and forms natural disaster-induced displacement
can take.”172 To precipitate this, he identifies five displacement-triggering
scenarios that are widely used by other scholars.173 These are (1) “hydro-
meteorological disasters (flooding, hurricanes/typhoons/cyclones [sic], mud-
slides etc.);”174 (2) zones designated by governments as being too high-risk
and “too dangerous for human habitation;”175 (3) “[e]nvironmental degrada-
tion and slow onset disasters (e.g., reduction of water availability, desertifi-
cation, recurrent flooding, salinisation of coastal zones etc.);”176 (4) “[t]he
case of ‘sinking’ small island states;”177 and (5) violent conflict triggered
167 FABRICE RENAUD ET AL., CONTROL, ADAPT OR FLEE: HOW TO FACE ENVIRONMENTAL
MIGRATION? 29–30 (2007), available at http://www.each-for.eu/index.php?module=main.
168 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
169 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
170 Id.
171 STEVE LONERGAN, THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN POPULATION
DISPLACEMENT 9 (1998).
172 See Kälin, supra note 37.
173 See id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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by a decrease in essential resources (e.g., water, land, food) owing to cli-
mate change.178
This classification has also been recently adopted by the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (“IASC”)179 Working Group on Migration/
Displacement and Climate Change, which was established to define mi-
gration and displacement induced by climate change.180 The IASC identi-
fies four causes of movement in the context of climate change.181 First,
“[h]ydro-meteorological extreme hazard events;” second, “[e]nvironmental
degradation and/or slow onset extreme hazard events;” third, “[s]ignificant
permanent losses in state territory as a result of sea level rise;” and last,
“[a]rmed conflict/violence over shrinking natural resources.”182
Within the scope of environmental degradation, some particular
incidents play major roles in making a particular place inhabitable and
consequently trigger mass human displacement.183 While the variety of
typologies provided by different authors and organizations demonstrate
that there is no single widely accepted standard for classifying disasters
that trigger environmental migration, five standards have found common
ground amongst the scholarly literature.184
1. Sudden Hydro-Meteorological Disasters
The increase in both number and severity of sudden-onset natural
disasters because of climate change, particularly hydro-meteorological
disasters such as flooding, hurricanes, typhoons, cyclones, and mudslides,
can cause large-scale displacement.185 As Margareta Wahlström points
178 See Kälin, supra note 37.
179 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (“IASC”) is a unique interagency forum for
humanitarian coordination and, for its members, a policy development and decision-making
forum involving key UN and non-UN humanitarian actors. The IASC was established in
June 1992 in response to UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of
humanitarian assistance. Welcome to the IASC, IASC, http://www.humanitarianinfo.org
/iasc (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
180 See Inter-Agency Standing Comm., Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: Who
Will Be Affected? 1, 4 (Working Paper, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs
/2008/smsn/igo/022.pdf.
181 Id. at 2–3.
182 Id.
183 Aurelie Lopez, The Protection of Environmentally-Displaced Persons in International
Law, 37 ENVTL. L. 365, 369 (2007).
184 LACZKO & AGHAZARM, supra note 3, at 250.
185 Displacement Caused by the Effects of Climate Change: Who Will Be Affected and What
are the Gaps in the Normative Frameworks for Their Protection (Inter-Agency Standing
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out, “[o]ver the past 30 years, disasters—storms, floods and droughts—
have increased threefold, according to the UN International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction.”186 In 2008, 20,293,413 people were displaced as a
result of climate-related disasters.187 Such disasters can cause immediate
and sudden casualties and obviously large-scale displacement.188
Displacement caused by sudden-onset disasters is easily identifiable
because environmental disasters are easy to observe and, in some cases,
reported by the media.189 When such disasters occur, people often must flee
from the affected area to avoid physical harm or loss of life.190 During and
in the aftermath of natural disasters, people often lose their livelihoods,
harvests, crops, and livestock are destroyed, at a minimum interrupting
their ability to subsist off the land.191 These kinds of impacts can influence
population movement.192 When the disasters are over, people’s ability to
return to their homes is dependent on the measures adopted for recovery
of “social, economic and physical characteristics of the affected area.”193
In most cases, this type of displacement “need not be long-term and return
in principle remains possible as [a] durable solution.”194 Thus, mobility
Comm. Background Paper, Oct. 10, 2008) (noting that “many hydro-meteorological disasters
will occur regardless of climate change and other disasters such as volcanoes or earthquakes
presumably have no linkage to such change. Nevertheless, they too may cause movement
of persons and such persons should not be treated differently from those affected by the
effects of climate change.”).
186 Margareta Wahlström, Before the Next Disaster Strikes: The Humanitarian Impact of
Climate Change, 44 U.N. CHRON. 30, 30 (2007), available at http://www.un.org:80/wcm
/content/site/chronicle/home/archive/issues2007/pid/4829.
187 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMAN AFFAIRS, MONITORING
DISASTER DISPLACEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 12 (2009), available at
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/%28httpInfoFiles%29
/12E8C7224C2A6A9EC125763900315AD4/$file/monitoring-disaster-displacement.pdf
[hereinafter OCHA, MONITORING DISASTER DISPLACEMENT].
188 Walter Kälin, Displacement Caused by the Effects of Climate Change: Who Will Be
Affected and What Are the Gaps in the Normative Framework for Their Protection?
(Brookings Inst. Working Paper, Oc. 10, 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu
/papers/2008/1016_climate_change_kalin.aspx.
189 Koko Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration: Governance Challenges,
20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 402, 405 (2010) [hereinafter Warner, Global Environmental
Change and Migration].
190 Id.
191 KOKO WARNER, ASSESSING INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE NEEDS RELATED TO ENVI-
RONMENTAL CHANGE AND HUMAN MIGRATION 2 (2010), available at http://www.ehs.unu
.edu/file/get/5301 [hereinafter WARNER, ASSESSING INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE NEED].
192 Id.
193 Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration, supra note 189, at 405.
194 Kälin, supra note 188.
2012] CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 737
decisions of people displaced by sudden hydro-meteorological disasters
are based on disaster management by the concerned authority.195
2. Slow-Onset Environmental Degradation
Long-term and gradual environmental degradation, such as
drought, desertification, reduced water availability due to melting gla-
ciers, land erosion, long-term effects of recurrent flooding, and increased sa-
linity in coastal zones due to sea level rise all cause large-scale progressive
displacement.196 These gradual changes deteriorate herding, farming, and
fishing, and may negatively affect livelihood systems that ultimately moti-
vate people to move in the long term.197 Communities in the affected areas
may increasingly choose to move to safer places to avoid life-threatening
environmental degradation likely to arise in the near future and avail
themselves of higher-quality living standards.198 Such migration is a chal-
lenging and complex issue.199 The gradual environmental impacts that com-
prise a more systematic environmental degradation are rarely reported
by media and concerned authority until the degradation transforms into
severe crisis.200 People may not return to their original homes due to loss
of the physical existence of their land (because of sea level rise and coastal
erosion) or livelihood (due to desertification, salinity, or extinction of fish
and other species).201 Provided the physical land is available, people may
still choose to return to their original homes if they can adopt an alterna-
tive livelihood.202 Kälin explains:
Such deterioration may not necessarily cause forced dis-
placement in the strict sense of the word but, among other
reasons, will incite people to move to regions with better
income opportunities and living conditions. However, if the
areas become uninhabitable because of complete desertifi-
cation or sinking coastal zones, then population movements
amount to forced displacement and become permanent.203
195 See WARNER, ASSESSING INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE NEED, supra note 191, at 2.
196 See, e.g., id. at 4–7.
197 Id. at 4.
198 See id.
199 See, e.g., Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration, supra note 189, at 409.
200 WARNER, ASSESSING INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE NEED, supra note 191, at 4.
201 Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration, supra note 189, at 409.
202 Id.
203 Kälin, supra note 188, at 3.
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However, slow-onset environmental changes tend to affect a larger
number of people than sudden acute disasters.204 For example, during the
period from 1979–2008, 718 million people were affected by storms com-
pared to 1.6 billion people affected by droughts.205
3. Small Island States at Risk of Disappearing Because of Sea
Level Rise
When lands are completely submerged due to sea level rise or the
area is no longer liveable because of a lack of basic infrastructure or the
inability to grow crops or obtain fresh water, people are compelled to move
to safer places. In these cases, permanent relocation requires people to
move to the mainland within either their own country or others, since the
alternative is not possible as the affected area no longer exists.206 In this
situation, people have no choice but to leave their homes. In some extreme
cases, the remaining territory of affected states can no longer accommodate
the whole population and some states, such as Tuvalu and the Maldives,
are at risk of complete submersion under water.207 Tuvalu, a nation of
11,000 people is the first nation at risk to be completely submerged under
water by this century.208 “Even if the country does not sink, it could become
increasingly inhospitable” due to the impacts of global warming and sea
level rise.209 The plants and crops may be destroyed due to salt water in-
trusion and extreme weather events.210 “The coral reefs could be devastated
by rising sea temperatures and ocean acidification.”211 All of these factors
have a severe impact on the food security of the islanders.
The most important feature of this type of movement is that the
migrants cannot return to their original home and are permanently dis-
placed to other countries.212 Although no substantial displacement occurred
until recently due to permanent loss of territory as a result of sea level rise,
“it is likely to be a significant driver of forced displacement in the future.
Approximately 146 million people live in areas with an elevation of less
204 See LACZKO & AGHAZARM, supra note 3, at 15.
205 International Disaster Database, EM-DAT, http://www.emdat.be/database (last visited
Mar. 16, 2012) (Select “Advanced Search.” Select all under “Location,” select “1970–2008”
under “Timeframe,” and select “Drought” and “Storm” under “Disaster Type.”).
206 WARNER, ASSESSING INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE NEED, supra note 191, at 5.
207 See Kravchenko, supra note 79, at 527; Kälin, supra note 188.
208 CORLETT, supra note 44, at 14.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See Kälin, supra note 188.
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than one met[er] above sea level.”213 When the whole state is at risk of com-
plete submersion, such as in the Maldives and Tuvalu, relocation to other
states is essential.214 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (“OCHA”) and International Displacement Monitor-
ing Centre (“IDMC”) study identified “forced displacement of 2,000 in-
habitants of the Tulun (Carteret) and 400 of the Takuu (Mortlock) islands
in Papua New Guinea” as the permanent displacements that had occurred
as of 2008.215 However, according to current IPCC findings, this trend is
likely to substantially accelerate in the future.216
4. Government-Initiated Planned Evacuation in Response
to Disasters
In case of natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, volcanic
eruptions, hurricanes, storm surges, or tsunamis, the most common and
fastest response is evacuation.217 “This will occur, for example, because of
an increased risk of mudslides in mountain regions, andalong [sic] rivers
and on coastal plains prone to flooding.”218 Usually, governments designate
the affected areas which are dangerous for human habitation as high-risk
zones.219 Then, governments initiate planned evacuation from such areas
that usually only involve a displacement a short distance away from the
high-risk zone.220 However, sometimes this sort of evacuation process may
lead to permanent internal displacement until other durable solutions are
found for those affected.221
5. Risk of Conflict Over Essential Resources
Environmental degradation is considered as both cause and effect
of armed conflict.222 The potential consequences of climate change are
213 OCHA, MONITORING DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 187, at 13.
214 See Jane McAdam, Environmental Migration Governance 9 (University of New South
Wales Faculty of Law Research Series Paper 1, 2009), available at http://law.bepress.com
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1143&context=unswwps.
215 OCHA, MONITORING DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 187, at 12.
216 See Nobuo Mimura et al., Small Islands, in IPCC: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY, supra note 7, at 692–93.
217 Lori M. Hunter, Migration and Environmental Hazards, 26 POPULATION & ENV’T 273,
283 (2005).
218 Kälin, supra note 37.
219 Id.
220 ADAMO, supra note 20, at 14.
221 See McAdam, supra note 214, at 9.
222 ADAMO, supra note 20, at 18.
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scarcity of water availability, food insecurity, depletion of natural resources,
and prevalence of disease.223 These impacts of climate change ultimately
lead to scarcity of resources and destroy infrastructure vital to livelihood.224
As a result, many people, especially in economically weak countries, have
to share limited resources. These circumstances “have been identified as
triggers or concomitant factors in the emergence or aggravation of conflict
situations.”225 The lack of security arising out of conflict ultimately leads
to mass migration. According to the OCHA and IDMC, forty-two million
people were displaced, including internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) and
refugees from conflict, in 2008.226
For example, drought, scarcity of water resources, and food inse-
curity are presently the most important climate change-induced vulnera-
bilities contributing to conflict and mass displacement in Africa.227 The
increasing competition for scarce land and water resources, as reported by
humanitarian agencies, ultimately leads to cross-border resource-based
armed conflicts and loss of life of people living along the borders of Sudan,
Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda.228
In each of these scenarios, people are displaced due to environmen-
tal degradation caused by either man-made or natural disasters. However,
the definitions of an environmental refugee provided by El-Hinnawi,
Jacobson, Lonergan, and Bates explicitly include both natural and human-
caused harm in their broader definitions of environmental refugee.229
223 See, e.g., supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
224 ADAMO, supra note 20, at 18.
225 Id.
226 OCHA, MONITORING DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 187, at 12.
227 LEIGHTON, supra note 121, at 4.
228 Id.
229 See, e.g., EL-HINNAWI, supra note 161, at 4; JACOBSON, supra note 163, at 38; Diane C.
Bates, Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental
Change, 23 POPULATION & ENV’T 465, 466 (2002); LONERGAN, supra note 171, at 7. These
authors interprets environment very widely and includes two other circumstances as
causation in their “environmental refugee” definitions. These are:
a. Technological hazards due to industrial accidents:
Industrial accidents as distinguished from natural hazards have the
potential role to degrade environmental conditions and cause mass human
displacement. Technological hazards as a result of natural disasters may
occur due to release of toxic materials, episodes of severe contamination,
structural collapse, and transportation, construction or manufacturing
accidents. There are many instances of this sort of disasters including
fatal gas leak in Bhopal, India (1986), radioactive releases from nuclear
plants in Chernobyl, Ukraine (1986) and Three Mile Island (TMI),
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However, many other scholars, including Frank Biermann and Ingrid
Boas, suggest protection for displacement stemming only from the specific
impacts of climate change.230 Although it is scientifically challenging to
identify the exact causation of these impacts,231 the IPCC classifies cer-
tain natural events ranging from “virtually certain” to “extremely unlikely”
which are likely to occur due to direct impacts of anthropogenic climate
change.232 This study considers only those impacts of climate change that
are identified by the IPCC as “virtual certainty” to “likely,” representing a
probability range of sixty percent to ninety-nine percent when examining
protection mechanisms for environmental displacement.
Pennsylvania (1979) in the 20th century. Most of these displacements
were, however, temporary.
b. Development projects:
Development projects such as dams and irrigation projects may lead to
large human movement. The Three Gorges Dam project in China is the
most glaring example of this which displaced over 1 million persons. The
construction of a dam on Kaptai Lake in Bangladesh for generation of
hydro-electric power also caused large number of displacement from
Bangladesh to neighbouring Assam in India. Over 100000 people lost their
homes and received no compensation from the then Pakistani government
as well as the succeeding Bangladeshi government.
EL-HINNAWI, supra note 161, at 4. In these two scenarios, climate change is not directly
responsible for human displacement. Rather the displacements are caused by human action.
For those migrations, there are separate national and international protection mechanisms.
For example, tort law is applicable to industrial accidents; international humanitarian
law (“IHL”) is applicable for armed conflicts; and international human rights law and UN
Guiding Principles on IDP are applicable to development-induced migration.
230 See Biermann & Boas, supra note 9, at 25.
231 According to the IPCC,
determining whether a specific, single extreme event is due to a specific
cause, such as increasing greenhouse gases, is difficult, if not impossible,
for two reasons: 1) extreme events are usually caused by a combination
of factors and 2) a wide range of extreme events is a normal occurrence
even in an unchanging climate.
Gabriele C. Hegerl et al., Understanding and Attributing Climate Change, in IPCC: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 7, at 696.
232 See IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 1, at 3. Where uncertainty in spe-
cific outcomes is assessed using expert judgment and statistical analysis of a body of evidence
(e.g., observations or model results), then the following likelihood ranges are used to express
the assessed probability of occurrence: virtually certain >99%; extremely likely >95%; very
likely >90%; likely >66%; more likely than not >50%; about as likely as not 33% to 66%;
unlikely <33%; very unlikely <10%; extremely unlikely <5%; exceptionally unlikely <1%.
See id.
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B. Typology of Environmental Migration Based on Extent and
Permanency of Movement
The impacts of climate change may be perceived differently by
people around the world due to geophysical variations (slow onset or spo-
radic environmental impacts) as well as “variable coping capacities of local
social, political, and economic structures.”233 Consequently, a similar cli-
matic phenomenon might not have the same effects on displacement. For
this reason, the types of human migration in response to the impacts of
climate change are diverse and complex.234 The victims of climate change
may move “as individuals, families, small groups, large groups, or mas-
sive crowds.”235 The extent of their movement could be over short or long
distances, and be permanent or temporary.236 Based on the possibility of
return to their original homes, people may choose to do so when conditions
so allow, or migrants may be unwilling or unable to return, resulting in a
permanent migration.237 The movement may be either internal, with people
moving shorter or longer distances to find new homes and livelihoods with-
in their own countries, or it can be international, with people who move
much further away crossing an international border or borders.238 Conse-
quently, such variety of typologies of climate change displacement makes
the study of environmental displacement difficult.239
Displacement Solutions states that displacement due to climate
change is likely to manifest itself in essentially six primary ways. These
are temporary displacement, “permanent local displacement,” “permanent
internal displacement,” “permanent regional displacement,” “permanent
intercontinental displacement,” and “temporary regional or international
displacement.”240 However, movements due to environmental change can
233 BOANO ET AL., supra note 95, at 13.
234 See Ketel, supra note 27, at 1; ADAMO, supra note 20, at 16–19.
235 Ketel, supra note 27, at 1.
236 ADAMO, supra note 20, at 14.
237 Susan F. Martin, Climate Change and International Migration 2 (The German Marshall
Fund of the United States Background Paper, 2010), available at http://isim.georgetown
.edu/publications/Martin_VB.pdf.
238 Ketel, supra note 27, at 1; UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CLIMATE
CHANGE, NATURAL DISASTERS AND HUMAN DISPLACEMENT: A UNHCR PERSPECTIVE 4
(2009), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a8e4f8b2.html.
239 Black, supra note 157, at 1.
240 DISPLACEMENT SOLUTIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FORCED HUMAN
DISPLACEMENT: CASE STUDIES AS INDICATORS OF DURABLE SOLUTIONS 4 (2008), available
at http://www.displacementsolutions.org/files/documents/Climate_Change_Displacement
_Meeting_Paper.pdf.
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be classified according to the extent of movement and the possibility of
return.241 Broadly, people are displaced either within or across borders.
While most of the movements are temporary, sometimes they become
permanent.242 Based on this trend, displacements can be classified in
four categories.
1. Temporary Internal Displacement
Traditionally, most displacement due to environmental change has
occurred within national boundaries.243 In the case of natural disasters
such as floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, storm surges,
or tsunamis, people are generally displaced temporarily and within very
short distances.244 In most cases, “people can to return to their habitats
and start rehabilitation [of] livelihoods and reconstruction [of] their houses”
once the event has ceased.245 Of course, some evacuees may choose to
permanently relocate to distant, safe places.
2. Permanent Internal Displacement
Slow onset movements are likely to be caused by direct impacts of
climate change, such as sea level rise, coastal inundation, and increasingly
frequent storm surges.246 These degradations cause irreversible changes
to the living environment and make certain areas unliveable due to deple-
tion of natural resources.247 In this situation, entire communities need to
be permanently relocated to less dangerous locales.248 When people move
far enough away from their places of original residence in response to pro-
gressive environmental degradation, return to their original homes tends
to be unlikely or impossible.249 Usually, this type of displacement occurs
domestically.250 For example, many people who are compelled to leave their
homes due to flood, cyclone, and river erosion in Bangladesh are moving
toward the capital city, Dhaka, for work and shelter.251 However, this local
241 King, supra note 158, at 545.
242 ADAMO, supra note 20, at 14.
243 Hugo, supra note 52, at 105.
244 ADAMO, supra note 20, at 14.
245 Stojanov, supra note 38, at 79; see also ADAMO, supra note 20, at 14.
246 King, supra note 158, at 548–49.
247 See id. at 548.
248 See ADAMO, supra note 20, at 5.
249 See Kälin, supra note 188, at 5.
250 Khalid Koser, Gaps in IDP Protection, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Oct. 2008, at 17.
251 See Hugo, supra note 52, at 114, 119.
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permanent displacement is difficult in densely populated developing coun-
tries like Bangladesh where a large number of people have to share limited
resources.252 There is also a risk that land owners may refuse to allow the
settlement of migrated victims of natural disasters.253
3. Temporary International Displacement
The environmental degradation severely affecting livelihood and
basic infrastructure in a particular area may motivate people to cross an
internationally recognized state border to secure life and shelter. The
degradation may be due to both sudden and gradual natural disasters.
Migrants leave their own countries because their countries’ protection and
assistance capacities are exhausted or they expect better protection and
assistance elsewhere.254 After the 2004 tsunami in Asia, many people from
Sri Lanka sought refuge in India.255 Many groups of tsunami victims were
received temporarily by other countries until permanent solutions were
negotiated and planned.256 However, this is a very rare phenomenon. It
is not easy to cross secured international borders unless neighboring or
other countries offer refuge on humanitarian grounds.257 Moreover, under
many immigration systems, and even some refugee programs, migrants
need education and sufficient resources to travel abroad.258 Thus, Norman
Myers’s assumption that a large of number of environmental migrants will
rush to developed countries is unlikely to happen in reality.259 Moreover,
environmental refugees’ status in international law is still unclear.
4. Permanent Cross-Border Displacement
In some extreme cases, environmental changes may deteriorate
conditions in such a way that the areas may become uninhabitable because
252 See id. at 124.
253 ADAMO, supra note 20, at 14.
254 Kälin, supra note 188, at 2.
255 See, e.g., TAMIL INFORMATION CENTRE, SRI LANKA TSUNAMI SITUATION: REPORT NUMBER 6,
at 15 (2006).
256 See, e.g., id.; DISPLACEMENT SOLUTIONS, supra note 240, at 4–5.
257 See Martin, supra note 237, at 4.
258 See id. at 3, 6.
259 See generally Myers, supra note 4 (arguing that as environmental degradation continues,
environmental refugees from developing nations will flood into the developed world in
search of a better life).
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of complete desertification, salination of soil and groundwater, or sinking
of coastal zones.260 In such circumstances, the inhabitants of such regions
tend to migrate to nearby countries for permanent protection.261 They de-
cide to move from their homes and cross the border because they have no
choice but to leave permanently, and they cannot find any durable solu-
tions either in the form of relocation or adaptation for their displacement
within their own countries.262 In some scenarios, they cannot return to
their country of origin because of a lack of security or sustainable liveli-
hoods there after natural disasters cease.263 This scenario is most likely
to arise in response to permanent inundation of small island states in the
Asia Pacific.264 This would involve, for instance, a citizen of Vanuatu or
Tuvalu migrating on a permanent basis to New Zealand, or people of the
Maldives to neighboring India or Sri Lanka. The President of the Maldives
has already expressed his desire to purchase land for the Maldivians in
India, Sri Lanka, or Australia.265 Vanuatu and Kiribati are also sending
educated and skilled citizens to neighboring developed countries such as
Australia and New Zealand to establish a network so that other people
from the island may follow if the situation deteriorates.266
The classification based on crossing “an internationally recognized
state border” will help to determine the jurisdiction and protection mecha-
nism.267 However, it is urgently needed to promote the development of more
sophisticated typologies of environmentally induced migration, since each
260 Kälin, supra note 188.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Cristine Russell, First Wave, SCI. NEWS, Feb. 28, 2009, at 27. Former President Mohamed
Nasheed announced at the end of 2008 that the Maldives was establishing a sovereign
wealth fund which could be used to purchase a new island for the country’s population.
Id. According to Nasheed, “[t]his trust fund will act as a national insurance policy to help
pay for a new homeland, should future generations have to evacuate a country disappearing
under the waves.” Id.
266 Maryanne Loughry & Jane McAdam, Kiribati—Relocation and Adaptation, FORCED
MIGRATION REV., Oct. 2008, at 51–52, available at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs
/FMR31/FMR31.pdf. Anote Tong, President of Kiribati, has also made it clear that the
population of his island might be forced to relocate en masse. Id. His focus has been on
identifying immigration possibilities for Kiribati nationals in nearby countries, particularly
Australia and New Zealand. Id. at 52. In a recent trip to New Zealand, he suggested that
the best educated Kiribatis should emigrate first, in an orderly fashion, and then establish
communities which others could join as the situation requires. Id.
267 Kälin, supra note 188, at 2.
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of the available forms of migration requires significantly different ap-
proaches and policy frameworks.268
III. OVERVIEW OF PREDICTED NUMBERS AND FIGURES OF
ENVIRONMENT/CLIMATE–INDUCED DISPLACEMENT
Climate change impacts are likely to produce considerable numbers
of displaced people, either temporarily or permanently, all over the world.269
As the Earth’s climate is rapidly changing, exceeding current scientific fore-
casts presented by the IPCC and other scientists regarding the potential
impacts of such change, a growing number of authors are putting forward
estimates of both the existing number of environmental displacements and
of potential future migration flows all over the world.270 United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres predicted at a press
conference at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 in
Copenhagen that “climate change will become the biggest driver of popu-
lation displacements, both inside and across national borders, within the
not too distant future.”271 Currently, there is no uniform global estimate
for the number of people displaced by climate change since no interna-
tional organization collects information on persons displaced by natural
disasters.272 Developing countries and the international community also
lack sufficient capacity to gather this type of data.273 So, the existence and
scope of the issue of climate displacement are often established by reference
to estimated figures of displaced people.274
The estimates of the potential magnitude of climate change-related
displacement vary depending on sources and methods.275 The consideration
268 BOANO ET AL., supra note 95, at 1–2, 13, 16, 31; Martin, supra note 237, at 2.
269 See, e.g., STERN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 111–14.
270 See, e.g., MORRISSEY, supra note 38, at 4.
271 Climate Change Could Become the Biggest Driver of Displacement, supra note 40.
272 See VIKRAM ODEDRA KOLMANNSKOG, NOR. REFUGEE COUNCIL, FUTURE FLOODS OF
REFUGEES: A COMMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONFLICT AND FORCED MIGRATION 13–14
(2008), available at http://www.nrc.no/arch/img/9268480.pdf.
273 OLI BROWN, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION:
OBSERVATIONS, PROJECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 17 (2007), available at http://hdr.undp
.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/papers/brown_oli.pdf.
274 See Tess Burton & David Hodgkinson, Towards a Convention for Persons Displaced
by Climate Change: A Discussion Note on the Relationship Between Adaptation and
Displacement 5 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The Hodgkinson Group—Climate
Change and Aviation Advisors), available at http://www.hodgkinsongroup.com/documents
/Draft%20Discussion%20Note%20Adaptation%20and%20Displacement.pdf.
275 See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 74, at 353; KOLMANNSKOG, supra note 272, at 9;
Williams, supra note 67, at 504; RENAUD ET AL., supra note 167, at 17; Black, supra note
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of different time frames also makes comparisons complicated.276 Basically,
migration experts and related organizations produce evidence depending
on their respective definitions of environmental displacement. Some re-
searchers have strict reservations in attempting to make predictions, while
others provide estimates with respect to numbers and figures of environ-
mental displacement.277 Based on a plausible range of emission scenarios,
current estimates typically range from twenty-five million to one billion
people, but is usually estimated that around 200–250 million people will
be displaced under any environmentally related circumstances by 2050.278
As far as actual numbers are concerned, there is little doubt that
“current predictions are fraught with numerous methodological problems
and caveats.”279 These figures have also been extensively debated in the
literature based on the issues of multi-causality of environmental dis-
placement and extent of migrants’ movement.280 There is a lack of rigor-
ous empirical research on this issue, but it is impossible to write about
environmental migration without some reference to statistics. Keeping
these shortcomings in mind, this section provides a review of the current
state of estimated environmental displacement and the existing debates
over the numbers.
A. Predicted Numbers and Figures
The available estimates of environmental displacement mainly vary
because of different time frames researchers provide for their predictions.
While some researchers predict current numbers of displacement, others
provide displacement estimates through 2050 or 2100.
157, at 2–7; Stephen Castles, Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense
of the Debate (United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees Working Paper No. 70, 2002).
276 ADAMO, supra note 20, at 13–14; King, supra note 158, at 544.
277 See KOLMANNSKOG, supra note 272, at 15–16.
278 See CHRISTIAN AID, supra note 154, at 50; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 15–18 (2001); NORMAN MYERS, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES: AN EMERGENT
SECURITY ISSUE 1–2 (2005); RENAUD ET AL., supra note 167, at 17; STERN REVIEW REPORT,
supra note 7, at 56, 77; Docherty & Giannini, supra note 74, at 353; Williams, supra note
67, at 506; Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World, 43
BIOSCIENCE 752, 752–53 (1993); Robert J. Nicholls, Coastal Flooding and Wetland Loss
in the 21st Century: Changes Under the SRES Climate and Socio-Economic Scenarios,
14 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 69–71 (2004); Biermann & Boas, supra note 9, at 9–10; Black,
supra note 157, at 7.
279 Biermann & Boas, supra note 9, at 9.
280 See DOMINIC KNIVETON ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: IMPROVING
METHODOLOGIES TO ESTIMATE FLOWS 5 (2008); see also Black, supra note 157, at 1–2;
Castles, supra note 275, at 3–5.
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1. Current Environmental Displacement
The impacts of climate change have already started to take place in
some parts of the world, thus contributing to displacement and migration.281
Recent studies confirm that the number of environmental migrants has in-
creased significantly in recent years.282 It is estimated that there are cur-
rently twenty-five million people worldwide who have been displaced for
environmental reasons, making environmental refugees the single largest
migrant group in the world.283 In 1989, the Executive Director of UNEP
reported that “as many as 50 million people could become environmental
refugees.”284 Stressing that climate change should not be considered a dis-
tant worry, António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, noted in 2009 that a staggering thirty-six million people were
displaced by natural disasters in 2008; more than twenty million were
forced to move by climate-related factors.285 In 2005, the United Nations
University’s Institute for Environment and Human Security estimated a
potential fifty million “environmental refugees” by 2010.286 In 2007, the
Secretariat of the UNFCC also offered similar estimates.287
2. Future Predictions by 2050 or 2100
In 1990, the First Assessment Report of the IPCC estimated that
by 2050, 150 million people could be displaced by climate change-related
phenomena, such as floods, storms, desertification, and increasing water
scarcity.288 To put this estimate in perspective, environmental refugees
281 WARNER, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER, supra note 45, at iv.
282 See, e.g., Falstrom, supra note 21, at 4.
283 Id. (citing an interview with Michelle Leighton, Director of Human Rights and
Environment Programs for the National Heritage Institute); see also CONISBEE & SIMMS,
supra note 5, at 36; Falstrom, supra note 21, at 4; Jessica B. Cooper, Note, Environmental
Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 480,
485 (1998); Havard, supra note 50, at 70.
284 Mostafa K. Tolba, Our Biological Heritage Under Siege, 39 BIOSCIENCE 725, 727 (1989).
285 Climate Change Could Become the Biggest Driver of Displacement, supra note 40.
286 Oli Brown, The Numbers Game, 31 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 8, 8 (2008).
287 Press Release, UNFCCC Secretariat, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Says Significant
Funds Needed to Adapt to Climate Change Impacts (April 6, 2007), available at http://
unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/070406
_pressrel_english.pdf.
288 See IPCC 1990 IMPACTS ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 3, 20, 2–22, 5–8; see also EQUITY &
JUSTICE WORKING GROUP BANGLADESH, CLIMATE CHANGE INDUCED FORCED MIGRANTS: IN
NEED OF DIGNIFIED RECOGNITION UNDER A NEW PROTOCOL (2009), available at http://www
.equitybd.org/notice_board_contain/cop16/Climate%20Migrant%20Printed%20Position.pdf.
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could comprise more than 1.5% of the predicted global population of nine
billion people in 2050.289 Advocacy groups and social scientists have pro-
duced a burgeoning literature about this category of migrants and recent
studies estimate even more people to be displaced by the same time.290
Perhaps the best-known estimate for future migration forced by cli-
mate change was made by Professor Norman Myers of Oxford University,
a widely known expert on this topic. In 1995, he observed that “global
warming could put large numbers of people at risk of displacement by the
middle of next century if not before.”291 He predicted the existence of more
than twenty-five million environmental refugees (ten million recognized,
fifteen million unrecognized) in 2002, which was greater than the eighteen
million then officially recognized refugees (political, religious, and ethnic).292
Looking ahead to 2050, he argued that “when global warming takes hold
there could be as many as 200 million people overtaken by disruptions of
monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes, by droughts of unprecedented
severity and duration, and by sea-level rise and coastal flooding.”293 Regard-
ing the regional estimation, Myers and Kent continued:
Preliminary estimates indicate the total [number] of people
at risk of sea-level rise in Bangladesh could be 26 million,
in Egypt 12 million, in China 73 million, in India 20 mil-
lion, and elsewhere 31 million, making an aggregate total
of 162 million. At the same time, at least 50 million people
could be at risk through increased droughts and other cli-
mate dislocations.294
These estimates are, however, criticized by other scholars, including
Dominic Kniveton, as stemming from a very rudimentary methodology.295
Yet, they have become the yardstick adopted in most of the reports and
studies in the absence of a more precise data set.296
289 CONISBEE & SIMMS, supra note 5, at 36.
290 See, e.g., NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, CLIMATE INST., ENVIRONMENTAL EXODUS:
AN EMERGENT CRISIS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 8 (1995).
291 Id.
292 Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century,
357 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 609, 613 (2002).
293 Myers, supra note 278, at 1.
294 MYERS & KENT, supra note 290, at 8.
295 Dominic Kniveton, Climate Change and Migration: Developing Methodologies, Presen-
tation to the Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability Conference (Oct. 9,
2008); see also KNIVETON ET AL., supra note 280, at 29; McAdam, supra note 214, at 1–2.
296 McAdam, supra note 214, at 1–2.
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Sir Nicholas Stern, in his authoritative review of climate change,
maintained that Myers and Kent’s earlier estimate of 150–200 million “has
not been rigorously tested” and the estimate of 200 million is “problematic”
and “conservative.”297 But, echoing the concern that the climate change will
lead to hundreds of millions of climate change migrants, the Stern Review
estimated that the scale of migration will reach 200 million by 2050.298
Other estimates vary dramatically in terms of “numbers, time frame
and causes.”299 Friends of the Earth, an international non-governmental
organization (“NGO”) based in Australia, predicts 150 million climate refu-
gees worldwide, including 1 million from small island states, by 2050.300
Offering the highest estimate, Christian Aid estimates that one billion
people will be forcibly displaced by 2050, principally arising from climate
change-induced natural disasters.301 In another estimate, Nicholls suggests
that between 50 and 200 million people could be displaced as a result of
climate change by 2080.302 However, most of the available predictions, in
general figure out of about 200–250 million environmental migrants by
middle of the century.303
IV. DEBATE OVER PREDICTED NUMBERS, NATURE, AND EXTENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION
The predicted amount of future environmental migrants is a
“daunting figure, a ten-fold increase on today’s entire population of docu-
mented refugees and [internally displaced persons].”304 However, Norman
Myers’s prediction of 200 million environmental migrants by 2050 is the
currently accepted estimate.305 This means that by 2050 one in every forty-
five people in the world will be displaced by climate change.306
However, the prediction of the scale and extent of environmentally
induced displacements is probably the most debatable issue in existing
literature.307 Migration and environment research tends to fall into two
297 STERN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 77.
298 Id. at 56.
299 Brown, supra note 286, at 8.
300 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO CLIMATE REFUGEES, at Fact Sheet 4 (2007).
301 CHRISTIAN AID, supra note 154, at 5.
302 Nicholls, supra note 278, at 71–72.
303 Biermann & Boas, supra note 9, at 9–10.
304 Brown, supra note 286, at 8.
305 See, e.g., id. at 8–9.
306 EQUITY & JUSTICE WORKING GROUP BANGLADESH, supra note 288, at 1.
307 ADAMO, supra note 20, at 13.
2012] CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 751
broad and extreme categories: the “minimalists,” who consider that the
environment plays a relative and nominal role in migration decisions;
and the “maximalists,” who propose that environment can be a distinct
factor that causes people to be forced to leave their homes.308 The available
predictions vary significantly because no measurable definition exists.309
Many fundamental questions about the numbers are raised in scientific,
policy, and academic literature.310 The available estimates are fiercely
contested.311 The main issue raised by the debate is whether it is possible
to predict with any degree of certainty the likely number and distribution
of persons displaced by environmental change.312 Critics argue that there
is “no evidence that environmental change leads directly to mass refugee
flows, especially flows to developed countries.”313 They also argue that
such estimates have a large margin of error and mostly depend on faulty
assumptions about population growth, economic development, temperature
increase, or the degree and timing of climate change.314 Black has criti-
cized estimates of “environmental refugees” by numerous authors as being
“without independent verification of [their] accuracy.”315 There is strong
advocacy from scholars including Black and Castles for recognition of the
multi-causality of environmental displacement.316 They criticize the uncrit-
ical acceptance of a direct causal link between environmental stress and
human displacement.317 However, several issues center around the debates
on estimated numbers, nature, and extent of environmental migration.
A. Multi-Causality of Environmental Migration
Migration is often the result of an intricate matrix of factors.318 The
conditions under which people leave their homes and migrate generally do
little to illuminate structural or root causes of their movement.319 In reality,
308 LACZKO & AZAGHARM, supra note 3, at 14.
309 Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration, supra note 189, at 403.
310 BOANO, supra note 2, at 13.
311 Burton & Hodgkinson, supra note 274, at 2.
312 Id. at 3.
313 Castles, supra note 275, at 2.
314 See, e.g., Astri Suhrke, Environmental Degradation and Population Flows, 47 J. INT’L
AFF. 478, 478–79 (1994); Castles, supra note 275, at 2–3; Black, supra note 157, at 2–3.
315 Black, supra note 157, at 1.
316 See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
317 See, e.g., LONERGAN, supra note 171, at 8.
318 King, supra note 158, at 545; see also LACZKO & AGHAZARM, supra note 3, at 51.
319 Ketel, supra note 27, at 1.
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“people make decisions over time to leave their communities for a complex
interplay of reasons.”320 Factors that play a significant role in this type of
migration include availability of sufficient resources to move, network (i.e.,
family and friends both at home and at potential points of destination), and
level of information and knowledge about the receiving country.321 Environ-
mental degradation as a result of climate change may be one of the many
triggering factors for migration,322 but, as expounded by Black, Castles,
and others, “it is hardly the only and often not even the most important
cause.”323 It is also difficult “to single out the impact of the environmental
effects of climate change on these decisions.”324 So it is often criticized that
most authors who provided a definition of “environmental refugee” failed
to recognize the multi-causality aspects of environmental migration.325
Implicit in the idea of environmental migration is the belief that
environmental degradation—as a possible cause of population displace-
ment—can be separated from other social, economic, or political causes.326
But environmental hardships are often aggravated by issues such as eco-
nomic hardship, military conflict, insecurity, social upheaval, exclusion,
injustice, and political instability.327 So when environmental deteriorations
cause displacements, they are often the byproduct of economic, demo-
graphic, or political factors.328 Some people leave voluntarily for “economic
opportunities, family, clan, or nationality reunion, and organized resettle-
ment schemes.”329 While some people flee because there is no other choice,
others flee preemptively before arrival of the compelling situation. Each
factor has the potential to trigger population movement.330 “The different
degrees of force and the complex set of influencing factors” made the
320 Elizabeth Ferris, Co-Director, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement,
Speech (Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/1017_natural
_disasters_ferris.aspx.
321 King, supra note 158, at 545.
322 See id.
323 Black, supra note 157, at 2–7; Castles, supra note 275, at 2–3; see also Gaim Kibreab,
Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique of the Current Debate,
21 DISASTERS 21–23 (1997); David Keane, Note, Environmental Causes and Consequences
of Migration: A Search for the Meaning of “Environmental Refugees,” 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL.
L. REV. 209, 221 (2004).
324 Ferris, supra note 320.
325 See Black, supra note 157, at 12–14.
326 LONERGAN, supra note 171, at 8.
327 Ketel, supra note 27, at 2.
328 See Hugo, supra note 52, at 113–15.
329 Ketel, supra note 27, at 2.
330 GER. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AS A SECURITY RISK
1 (2008).
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study of environmental migration difficult.331 So it is difficult to point to
a single factor responsible for migration due to environmental reasons,
as the causes in most cases are intermixed.332 The conflict in Darfur, for
example, has been recognized as stemming from an ecological crisis in the
region, which, at least in part, was caused by climate change.333
Richard Black, after reviewing a wide range of studies on environ-
mental degradation-induced migration, claims that there is no convincing
evidence that it leads to large-scale displacement.334 He also points out that
the links postulated in the literature between environment and migration
are not explicitly demonstrated.335 Black recognizes that environmental
degradations and catastrophes, such as rising sea levels, flood, cyclones,
and declining water supplies are very real and important factors in the
decision to migrate.336 But he finds little evidence of actual permanent
large-scale displacement directly caused by these factors.337 “Rather they
are part of complex patterns of multiple causalit[ies], in which natural and
environmental factors are closely linked to economic, social and political
ones.”338 Many other interrelated issues, such as conflict, human rights,
gender, levels of development, public health, and governance question de-
cisions to migrate for environmental reasons.339 For this reason, he con-
siders the “conceptualization [of environment] as a primary cause of forced
displacement” as “unhelpful and unsound intellectually, and unnecessary
in practical terms.”340
In this context, Lonergan suggests that environmental factors
cannot be easily separated from other socioeconomic and political factors
and processes triggering migration.341 Castles takes a more nuanced view,
noting that migration involves “complex patterns of multiple causality, in
which natural and environmental factors are closely linked to economic,
social, and political ones.”342 Dominic Kniveton and his co-authors accept
331 See ACKETOFT, supra note 27, at 2.
332 Havard, supra note 50, at 67.
333 DAN SMITH & JANANI VIVEKANANDA, A CLIMATE OF CONFLICT: THE LINKS BETWEEN
CLIMATE CHANGE, PEACE AND WAR 12 (2007) (quoting United Nations Secretary General
Ban Ki-Moon).
334 See Black, supra note 157, at 3–5.
335 Id. at 5.
336 Id. at 14.
337 Id.
338 Castles, supra note 275, at 5.
339 Int’l Org. for Migration, supra note 76, at 2.
340 See Black, supra note 157, at 1.
341 LONERGAN, supra note 171, at 10.
342 Castles, supra note 275, at 5.
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the idea of multiple factors influencing migration decisions.343 They state
their position that “[i]t has become evident . . . that the assumption that
climate variability leads to migration in a linear way is not supported by
empirical investigation. In short, these studies have found that many other
factors play into the nexus between climatic factors and migration.”344
Thus, there is fierce debate among academia and policymakers
stemming from confusion regarding the multi-causality of environmental
migration. Summarizing the debate, IOM states:
[P]art of the controversy stems from the fact that those who
migrate partly or wholly for environmental reasons span a
large continuum—from those who are suddenly displaced by
an extreme environmental event to those who pre-emptively
migrate due to deteriorating environmental conditions. While
most of these migrants remain within their countries of ori-
gin, some cross international borders. Similarly, some mi-
grate temporarily and others permanently.345
However, trying to isolate specific reasons why people migrate and
focusing too much on the problem of multi-causality has the dangerous
risk of denying the rights of forced climate migrants. The policymakers,
relying on this excuse, may fragment the issue and responsibility for it,
which will ultimately lead to the denial of migrants’ rights.346
B. Migration as a Coping Strategy
Refuting the existence of environmental migration, some scholars
regard migration as one of a variety of important survival strategies used
by people in the face of natural or man-made disasters since the dawn of
civilization.347 For example, Black considers environmental migration as a
“customary coping strategy.”348 Migration in the Sahel zone and similar re-
gions is a coping strategy that has been used by those people for centuries,
and is cyclical rather than permanent.349 Migration is thus considered “an
343 KNIVETON ET AL., supra note 280, at 37.
344 Id. at 6.
345 INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 71, at 21.
346 Merit Hietanen, Summary of Professor Roger Zetter’s Comments at Environmental
Change and Displacement Workshop: Assessing the Evidence and Developing Norms for
Response (Jan. 8–9, 2009).
347 See Hugo, supra note 52, at 105.
348 See Black, supra note 157, at 6.
349 Id. at 6–7.
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essential part of the economic and social structure of the region, rather
than a response to environmental decline.”350
Rafael Reuveny also views environmental migration as an adaptive
strategy to confront climate change.351 Reuveny’s premise is that individ-
uals have agency in their decisions to migrate, and they will prefer to move
if they consider the net benefit of moving to be larger than that of remain-
ing in their current locations.352 Among possible options of destinations both
within and across their home countries’ borders, their decision-making
comes through “the largest net benefit” criteria; they choose the option
which is ultimately the most beneficial for them.353 Thus, migration may
be a probable coping strategy in response to impacts of climate change. As
Boano stated, “climate change itself is unlikely to be the sole or even the
most important ‘push factor’ in [a] migration decision.”354
C. The Complexity of Linking Migration Responses to
Environmental Events
Some authors argue that environmental displacement is a complex
and challenging issue not because the environmental impacts cannot be
fully known; rather, the ways humans respond to such changes make the
study complicated.355 They identify faults in some of the statistical analysis.
According to Black, the causal link postulated between an identified envi-
ronmental event, such as drought, and human movement is not explicitly
demonstrated.356 In many cases, researchers calculate the extent of envi-
ronmental displacement by simply considering the predicted environmental
changes and the number of current or predicted population in the affected
areas without applying any widely accepted methodology.357 Their assump-
tion is based merely on “common sense” that people will eventually decide
to flee in the face of environmental disasters.358 These generalized as-
sumptions about “common sense” often fail to take into account human
350 RICHARD BLACK, REFUGEES, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 28 (1998).
351 Rafael Reuveny, Climate Change–Induced Migration and Violent Conflict, 26 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 656, 658 (2007).
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 BOANO, supra note 2, at 9.
355 See, e.g., CORLETT, supra note 44, at 14–15.
356 See Black, supra note 157, at 8.
357 Biermann & Boas, supra note 9, at 9 (noting that the number of people affected by cli-
mate change during a given time period depends on the assumed population growth rate).
358 See Castles, supra note 275, at 3.
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reaction and adaptation to environmental change.359 Thus it remains
unclear whether and how many people at risk choose migration as the
main strategy.360
Leaving aside the human response to impacts of environmental
change, in some cases there is also a “lack of consideration of changes in
human behavior leading to different adaptive practices.”361 There is always
an obvious link between the quantity of environmentally displaced per-
sons and the level of poverty in migrants’ home areas.362 Susceptibility to
climate change mostly “depends on the extent to which [people] are de-
pendent on natural resources and ecosystem[s].”363 The more people are
dependent on natural resources and the less they rely on economic or
human capital, the more vulnerable they are to the impacts of climate
change.364 Consequently, they are at risk in environmental degradations
due to climate change since these may affect declining natural resources.
However, some predictions do not consider the possibility of changes
in human behavior and adaptation programs.365 People may adapt to
changed circumstances and become resilient with environmental changes,
building dikes, inventing new agricultural processes, and improving re-
location systems.366 The Stern Review Report is clear in this respect and
states that “[t]he exact number of people who will actually be displaced
or forced to migrate will depend on the level of investment, planning and
resources” that the government has to implement such strategies.367 Apart
from impacts of climate change to vulnerability of poor countries, a combi-
nation of poor socioeconomic conditions (including high debt levels, failing
economies, a malfunctioning of the rule of law, poor governance, corrup-
tion, and transnational organized crime) and natural resource and space
limitations (including population growth, ecosystem degradation, and com-
petition for limited resources) aggravate the situation making it difficult for
such states to adapt to climate change.368 For example, small island states
359 See LONERGAN, supra note 171, at 11.
360 Black, supra note 157, at 7–8; Castles, supra note 275, at 3.
361 ADAMO, supra note 20, at 5.
362 Ketel, supra note 27, at 1–2.
363 Jon Barnett & W. Neil Adger, Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict,
26 POL. GEOGRAPHY 639, 641 (2007).
364 Id.
365 See Biermann & Boas, supra note 9, at 9.
366 Id.
367 STERN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 112.
368 McAdam & Saul, supra note 74, at 6; see also John Connell, Environmental Change,
Economic Development, and Emigration in Tuvalu, 22 PAC. STUD. 1 (1999).
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(such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Maldives) are particularly more vul-
nerable and less resilient to impacts of climate change because of their
small size, fragile economy, developmental inequality, and low adaptive
capacity.369 The costs involved for adaptation programs including build-
ing infrastructure and settlement protection, are a significant proportion
of their gross domestic product (“GDP”), and are well beyond the financial
means of most small island states.370 Thus small island states are less able
to mitigate or adapt to climatic changes and climatic impacts therefore
disproportionately affect their people.
On the other hand, some states with financial and logistic resources
might be able to adapt to changes caused by climatic shifts and adopt ap-
propriate protection to mitigate the impacts of climate change by build-
ing sea dykes and embankments.371 For example, the Netherlands, though
situated below sea level, like Bangladesh, has better adaptive capacity due
to an abundance of resources.372 The Netherlands has built up huge capital
resources which it can harness toward protection of its own people by rais-
ing the height of dykes or building new ones.373 Conversely, Bangladesh
and other deltaic and low-lying countries in the global south do not pos-
sess the same capital wealth.374 Lack of extensive capital resources puts
Bangladesh in a highly vulnerable position.375
D. Lack of Clear Definition of Environmental/Climate Change
Migration
There is no internationally recognized term to date to define the
people moved for environmental reasons.376 Terms and concepts such as
environmental migration, climate change-induced migration, ecological or
environmental refugees, climate refugees, climate change migrants, and
environmentally induced forced migrants are found scattered throughout
the emerging literature.377 The authors interpret these terms haphazardly
369 See Mimura et al., supra note 216, at 692–93.
370 Id. at 694.
371 McAdam & Saul, supra note 74, at 6.
372 See id. n.37.
373 Id.
374 See Peter Custers, Bangladesh: Climate Change as a Burning Political Issue, NEW AGE
(June 13, 2009), http://banglapraxis.wordpress.com/2009/06/13/bangladesh-climate-change
-as-a-burning-political-issue.
375 See id.
376 Int’l Org. for Migration, supra note 76, at 4.
377 Generally, persons forcibly displaced across borders for environmental reasons have been
referred to as “environmental refugees” or “climate refugees.” No existing legal instrument
explicitly protects people who flee environmental threats. For a definition of that group,
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based on their own concepts and the protection mechanisms they suggest.378
The variety of terms interchangeably used by the researchers and policy-
makers thwarts progress on the recognition of and legal protection for
environmentally displaced persons.379 Warner identifies two substantial
points responsible for the failure to establish clear definitions of concepts
and terms related to climate change-induced displacement.380 First, the
inherent difficulties in isolating environmental factors from other migra-
tion drivers make the conceptualization of the issue complex.381 Second,
“defining” climate change displacement creates obligations on the inter-
national community to adopt appropriate institutional and governance
measures to address the problem.382 The international community, and in
particular developed countries, has yet to reach on consensus on recognition
of this category of people.383 Developed nations have strong reservations
against “environmental migrants,” as they fear that the concept would open
the floodgate of migrants from developing and least developed countries
(“LDC”) to developed countries in the guise of “environmental migrants.”384
However, the definition, adopted by consensus, serves an instru-
mental purpose in delimiting rights and obligations of displaced people.385
After creating a definition, a legal and institutional framework can be
constructed to relocate communities. Castles observes, “we cannot get
around [the] definitional issue . . . easily, for definitions are crucial in
guiding the policies of governments and international agencies towards
mobile people.”386 This is also necessary in order to ensure coherence across
regions and between populations.387 Myers and Kent observe that “[t]here
therefore, one must turn to academic literature, in which there is a lively theoretical debate.
Most of those who study environmental migration discuss the broader class of environ-
mental refugees rather than the more specific subset of climate change refugees. They
use a variety of terms to refer to this group of people and its subcategories.
378 See, e.g., LACZKO & AGHAZARM, supra note 3, at 18–19.
379 ACKETOFT, supra note 27, at 1, 3. This conclusion parallels Walter Kälin, who argues:
“We should not be distracted by semantic discussions with little practical meaning about
whether to call affected persons ‘climate change refugees,’ ‘environmental migrants,’ or
something else. Instead what is needed is a thorough analysis of the different contexts and
forms natural disaster induced displacement can take.” Kälin, supra note 188.
380 WARNER, ASSESSING INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE NEED, supra note 191, at 1, 2.
381 Id. at 1.
382 Id. at 2.
383 See BROWN, supra note 148, at 14.
384 See id.
385 McAdam, supra note 214, at 7.
386 Castles, supra note 275, at 9.
387 Cf. McAdam, supra note 214, at 7 (“The absence of definition may allow for more flexible
responses—ad hoc responses within a formalized framework. It may permit States a limited
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is need of a definition that (a) is easily understood, (b) commands a wide
measure of agreement, (c) is capable of ready documentation and quanti-
fication, and (d) proves acceptable to policy makers and planners as well as
scientific analysts.”388 The lack of agreement over a consistent definition
has further complicated the complex nature of environmental migration.
V. THE CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENT, AND MIGRATION NEXUS:
COMPLEXITY VERSUS REALITY AND EQUITY
Most of the arguments about the multi-causality of environmental
migration are based on the notion that it is difficult to distinguish between
migrants driven by environmental factors and those forced by political and
socioeconomic problems.389 They argue that “poverty, scarcity of natural
resources, and political conflict [may] influence the nexus between envi-
ronmental stressors and migration.”390 However, there are many instances
where there is an interrelationship between poverty and depletion of
natural resources due to environmental degradations, especially when
the community is dependent on natural resources for their livelihood.391
Thus, “[e]nvironmental degradation and resource depletion play a con-
tributing role in affecting population movement, as they are often filtered
through contexts of poverty, food deficiency, social inequity and personal
insecurity.”392 The result is that people can be forced to leave their tradi-
tional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a lack of access to
natural resources and/or an environmental disruption that jeopardized
their existence and seriously affected the quality of their life.393
According to Myers, “people who migrate because they suffer
outright poverty are also frequently driven by root factors of environmen-
tal destitution.”394 In any case, environmental degradation and depletion
of natural resources play a significant role in determining economic
discretion, either by failing to define the term or by giving it a particular meaning in par-
ticular instruments. It is not yet clear whether a universally applicable definition of those
displaced by climate change is necessary or desirable.”).
388 MYERS & KENT, supra note 290, at 17.
389 See, e.g., LACZKO & AGHAZARM, supra note 3, at 17.
390 See, e.g., KNIVETON ET AL., supra note 280, at 32.
391 Robert Stojanov, Environmental Migration—How Can Be Estimated and Predicted, in
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT TO SOCIETY, REGIONS AND STATES 302–11 (2006), available
at http://www.vos.cz/imdr/documents/EM-How_can_be_predicted.pdf.
392 Id. at 302.
393 Id. at 304.
394 See Myers, supra note 278, at 2.
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development or vulnerability and also in migration decisions.395 “Myers’s
estimates of ‘environmental refugees’ are driven by three major sources:
population growth, sea-level rise and an increase in extreme weather
events.”396 Developing countries suffer from the impacts of climate change,
as the population growth is very high and they are already vulnerable to
environmental change due to a lack of good governance and prevailing de-
velopmental inequality.397 “[P]eople living in densely populated, low lying
regions such as the Nile Delta, the east coast of China, and Bangladesh”
are likely to face forced displacement due to the combined impact of sea
level rise, increased extreme weather events, flooding, and the salination
of soil.398
Of course, Myers recognizes the multiplicity of factors working be-
hind environmental migration.399 There exist two types of displacement
populations at opposite ends of the spectrum.400 One is driven mainly by
environmental problems; the other, though affected by environment, is
mainly moved by economic reasons, for better opportunities or lifestyle.401
Indeed, “migration always involves a multiplicity of causation”
and is the outcome of the complex interaction of many environmental and
other socioeconomic factors.402 The decision of traditional refugees who
flee due to persecution also depends on various other factors. The “fear
of persecution” in traditional refugee law may arise from socioeconomic
factors such as poverty, impoverishment, lack of good governance, and
social and political instability.403 A refugee can invoke protection even
though the chance of “well founded fear of persecution” is less than fifty
percent.404 The UNHCR Handbook states:
In general, the applicant’s fear should be considered well-
founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his
395 Stojanov, supra note 38, at 82.
396 MORRISSEY, supra note 38, at 4; see also Myers, supra note 292, at 609.
397 MORRISSEY, supra note 38, at 4.
398 Id.
399 Myers, supra note 292, at 610.
400 Id.
401 Id.
402 Gregory S. McCue, Environmental Refugees: Applying International Environmental
Law to Involuntary Migration, 6 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 157 (1993).
403 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); Chan v. Minister for
Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, 397 (Austl.).
404 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431; Chan v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs
(1989) 169 CLR 379, 397 (Austl.).
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continued stay in his country of origin has become intoler-
able to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or would
for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there.405
Environmental migration should not be treated in a different and
exceptional way.406 No one single environmental factor motivates people to
migrate.407 Myriad factors can work simultaneously to inspire movement.408
Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between migrants driven by environmen-
tal factors and migrants driven by other socioeconomic problems.409 It is
not justified to ignore the protection of environmental migration due to the
existence of the problem of multi-causality.410 This Article argues for pro-
tection of those migrants for whom the environment is the primary cause
of movement. The causes of environmental displacement are complex and
interdependent. Generally, the concept of “environmental disruption” is
defined widely in the definitions of El-Hinnawi, Jacobson, and Myers.411
Many scholars argue that the concept of environmental refugees fails to ex-
plain in which way exactly environmental factors force people to migrate.412
Other scholars have limited the environmental factors to certain environ-
mental degradations that directly displace people. For example, Biermann
and Boas propose a restrictive notion of environmental degradations as
a result of climate change to arrive at a conceptualization of “climate
refugee” which is “analytically valuable and politically acceptable and
meaningful for a global governance regime.”413 They exclude certain types
of environmental displacement from their definition of “climate refugee.”414
Biermann and Boas exclude the following categories of people from their
protection regime: (1) those climate migrants who have no apparently
credible cause for forced migration, or if any, that is only marginal (such
405 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA
FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES para. 42 (1992).
406 MYERS & KENT, supra note 290, at 29.
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 Id. at 17.
410 Stephen Castles, Afterword: What Now: Climate-Induced Displacement After Copenhagen,
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 244 (Jane
McAdam ed., 2010).
411 See, e.g., EL-HINNAWI, supra note 161, at 4; Myers, supra note 278, at 752.
412 See Perch-Nielsen et al., supra note 89, at 376.
413 Biermann & Boas, supra note 9, at 4.
414 Id.
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as heat waves and the spread of tropical diseases); (2) people who are dis-
placed due to factors related to the mitigation of, or adaptation to, climate
change; (3) migration related to other types of environmental degradation
(such as industrial accidents or disasters unrelated to human activities,
such as volcano eruptions); and (4) secondary, or indirect, impacts of cli-
mate change (such as conflicts over diminishing natural resources).415 Astri
Suhrke divides her own discussion into migration stimulated by “defores-
tation, rising sea levels, desertification and drought, land degradation,
and . . . water and air degradation.”416
Although science cannot determine specifically if climate change
caused a particular environmental event, the latest IPCC Report enumer-
ates a list of natural events that it describes as “consistent with” anthro-
pogenic climate change, including warmer temperatures, more frequent
droughts, more intense storms, and rising sea levels.417 The IPCC describes
the occurrence of higher temperatures as “virtually certain,” and the other
changes listed above as “very likely” or “likely.”418 The IPCC identifies
(a) increased incidence of extreme high sea level (excluding tsunamis);
(b) intense tropical cyclone activity increases; and (c) areas affected by
drought increases, as “likely,” that is, with more than sixty-six percent
probability.419 Climate change science continues to evolve to determine
more accurately the impacts of climate change on human life.420 The ob-
vious link between these impacts and human movement is established
by various reports and studies.
Notwithstanding the existence of multi-causality in environ-
mental migration, there are certain types of population displacements
where people are forced to move from their habitat due to loss of land,
resources, or infrastructure. Indeed, there are some locales and commu-
nities, especially in rural areas, that are exclusively dependent upon the
environment for their sustenance; they are often identified as amongst
415 See id.
416 ASTRI SUHRKE, AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCI., PRESSURE POINTS: ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION, MIGRATION AND CONFLICT 11–13 (1993).
417 IPCC: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (WG-II), supra note 35, at 18.
418 See id. According to the IPCC standards, “virtually certain” means more than a ninety-
nine percent probability; “very likely” means more than ninety percent probability; and
“likely” means more than sixty-six percent probability. Id. at 21.
419 See id. According to the IPCC standards, “virtually certain” means more than a ninety-
nine percent probability; “very likely,” means more than ninety percent probability; and
“likely” means more than sixty-six percent probability. Id. at 21.
420 The IPCC is writing its fifth assessment report. Home, IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/ (last
visited Mar. 16, 2012).
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the most vulnerable to climate change.421 For these people, ecology is
indistinguishable from economy.422 In this type of displacement, push
factors relating to their homes are more important than pull factors such
as social and economic conditions.423
There are two important features of this type of environmental
displacement: first, the environment in a particular area has been de-
graded in such a way that human life is impossible, and second, that en-
vironmental degradation is directly responsible for human movement.424
For example, drought, one of the prominent impacts of climate change,
makes it impossible for farmers to sustain their livelihoods.425 Conse-
quently, they are compelled to move elsewhere as they can no longer con-
tinue lives at their original homes because of forces beyond their control.426
They do not freely make the choice to leave their communities “in search
of better life—a higher income or improved access to services” like eco-
nomic migrants.427 Rather, they leave as life becomes impossible in their
home communities.428 But the question of habitability should not remain
as “purely subjective.”429 Humans have attained the capacity to adapt to
the most extreme environmental conditions; be it “amid ice and darkness
or in the glare of desert heat.”430 As a general rule, people do not want to
leave their traditional homelands.431 If they are compelled to leave their
homes, people usually prefer to return as soon as possible.432 Measuring
compulsion and assessing when a particular place becomes uninhabitable
should be founded on objective criteria based on the questions as suggested
by Corlett:
How do you determine and measure climate related fac-
tors leading to displacement? How will they be separated
from other factors, including other environmental factors,
which may lead to dislocation? At what point does a physical
421 See Burton & Hodgkinson, supra note 274, at 6.
422 See Myers, supra note 278, at 752.
423 ADAMO, supra note 20, at 14.
424 See Bates, supra note 229, at 468–69.
425 Ferris, supra note 320.
426 Id.
427 Id.
428 Id.
429 See CORLETT, supra note 44, at 50.
430 Id.
431 See, e.g., id.
432 Id.
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environment become so degraded that it is no longer capable
of sustaining a human existence?433
This Article proposes that there should be a protection mechanism
for four main climate change-related displacement scenarios, where dis-
placement is caused by: (a) global warming and sea level rise, i.e., sinking
of coastal zones and possible total submersion of low-lying island states;
(b) weather-related disasters, such as hurricanes, flooding, drought, deserti-
fication and melting of glaciers; (c) depletion of natural resources due to
gradual environmental deterioration; and (d) increased slow-onset disaster
risks resulting in relocation of people from high-risk zones.
It must be conceded that it is not very easy to draw a clear distinc-
tion between voluntary and forced movement.434 Sometimes, people face
refugee-like situations where the victim has limited control over the whole
process and a high degree of vulnerability.435 On the other hand, there
are some occasions where people face migrant-like situations where they
have greater control over the process and less vulnerability even though
people are moving in response to deteriorating situations.436 Between these
extremes, environment-induced displacement would be characterized as
voluntary, with displaced person having “more control over timing and
direction and less vulnerability than refugees have, but less control and
more vulnerability than migrants.”437
CONCLUSION
The environment, climate change, and migration nexus is a com-
plex one.438 Yet emerging scientific studies confirm that climate change has
a substantial role in human displacement.439 “Climate change, in itself,
does not directly displace people but it produces environmental effects that
make it difficult” or impossible for people to sustain their livelihoods.440
Sea level rise caused by glacial melt is likely to cause flooding of coastal
areas.441 People may be compelled to move as the low-lying coastal areas
433 Id.
434 See, e.g., Bates, supra note 229, at 467.
435 Id. at 473.
436 See ADAMO, supra note 20, at 14.
437 Id.
438 See, e.g., LACZKO & AGHAZARM, supra note 3, at 13.
439 See, e.g., Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration, supra note 189, at 402.
440 LACZKO & AGHAZARM, supra note 3, at 248; see also Ferris, supra note 320.
441 Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link 4–5
(Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, Int’l Peace Acad., 2007), available at http://
www.undp.org/cpr/iasc/content/docs/Jan08_Links/Doc_3.pdf.
2012] CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 765
may be contaminated with saline water and thus affect human habitats.442
Scarcity of water resources due to drought and desertification may moti-
vate people to migrate from “unproductive and water-scarce areas” to safer
places.443 The changed and variable weather patterns “lead to dramatic
climate events such as hurricanes, typhoons,” and flooding, which may
also affect human habitat.444
“The simple fact is,” as Oli Brown observes, that “nobody really
knows with any certainty what climate change will mean for human popu-
lation distribution.”445 Environmental migration cannot be predicted with
much accuracy or certainty due to several factors. Laczko and Aghazarm
identify four important reasons for this uncertainty.446
First, there is limited reliable data that confirms the exact number
of people to be displaced due to climate change “in developing countries
which are likely to be most vulnerable to climate change.”447
Second, a variety of factors often guide the decision to migrate, of
which environmental change is only one.448 It is difficult to disaggregate
the role of climate change from other economic, political, and social factors
which also contribute to triggering migration.449 The uncertainty arises
partly due to disagreement among experts on the role of the environment
in inducing migration.450 The wide variety of estimates of the number of
displaced persons offers an “inadequate basis for formulating policies.”451
Third, there is an absence of an adequate definition for what con-
stitutes a climate change refugee in international law.452 The disagreement
on the role of the environment in inducing migration leads to further dis-
agreement over terminology.453 That is why, still, there is no consensus on
the definition of climate or environmental migration among researchers.454
How the people who move based fully or partially on environmental rea-
sons are characterized “as economic migrants, migrant workers, de facto
442 See id. at 4.
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 BROWN, supra note 273, at 6.
446 LACZKO & AZAGHARM, supra note 3, at 20.
447 Id.
448 Id. at 20; BOANO, supra note 2, at 15.
449 LACZKO & AZAGHARM, supra note 3, at 20.
450 See id. at 19.
451 BOANO ET AL., supra note 95, at 1.
452 LACZKO & AZAGHARM, supra note 3, at 20.
453 See id. at 19.
454 See Biermann & Boas, supra note 9, at 9.
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refugees, or as some hybrid” carries implications for estimates.455 Research-
ers use different terminology and definitions in their studies, which leads
to inconsistencies in results.456 Many researchers interpret the concepts
of climate or environmental refugees widely; this, as Suhrke correctly
observes, “invite[s] large numbers.”457 “Myers himself admits that his esti-
mate, although calculated from the best available [and limited] data, re-
quired some ‘heroic extrapolations.’ ”458
Fourth, no one can predict the impacts of environmental change
with certainty.459 The “[e]xact numbers remain controversial, partly be-
cause scientists cannot predict with precision how quickly sea levels will
rise” and where and how the effects of climate change will manifest.460
Moreover, apart from climatic changes, the calculation of numbers depends
on “different methods of projecting displacement; . . . [and] unknowable
human variables such as strategies to mitigate, adapt to, and cope with
the effects of climate change in particular localities.”461 Still climate change
science has not developed to reach the capacity to measure the “impact of
individual choice, the potential for international action, and the variability
of future emissions and meteorological scenarios.”462
However, regardless of the lack of precise estimates and questions
of geographic distribution, there is widespread acceptance that environ-
mental degradation and stresses as a result of global climate change play
an increasingly significant role in causing or intensifying “major forced
displacements” over time.463 The scope and scale of such flows, both inter-
nally and across national boundaries, is expected to mount drastically in
coming years.464 Thus environmental displacement, as reported in many
studies and scientific reports, has rapidly been emerging as a delicate prob-
lem involving international peace and security which deserves the attention
455 McAdam & Saul, supra note 74, at 4.
456 See Biermann & Boas, supra note 9, at 9.
457 Suhrke, supra note 314, at 478.
458 BROWN, supra note 273, at 6.
459 See LACZKO & AZAGHARM, supra note 3, at 20.
460 McAdam & Saul, supra note 74, at 4.
461 Id.
462 LACZKO & AZAGHARM, supra note 3, at 20.
463 PIGUET, supra note 67, at 8; see also Nurit Kliot, Environmentally Induced Population
Movements: Their Complex Sources and Consequences: A Critical Review, in ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POPULATION MIGRATION 75 (Jon D. Unruh et al. eds.,
2004).
464 Int’l Org. For Migration, supra note 76, at 1; see also WARNER, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER,
supra note 45, at iv.
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of the international community.465 Once this widely agreed-upon point is
accepted, the role of climate change in population movement should not be
ignored.466 Academic and political discourse on the issue of environmental
refugees should not be exclusively limited to the highly contentious debate
over the potential numbers of “climate change displaced persons.”467
It is true that “[t]here are complex linkages between climate change
and human mobility.”468 Nonetheless the existence of a clear link between
anthropogenic climate change and consequent displacement has been in-
creasingly recognized.469 However, the tools of analysis are insufficiently
sophisticated to determine who will migrate, when, and why.470 Moreover,
there is no accepted form of methodology for calculating the number of cli-
mate migrants due to the problem of multi-causality.471 This debate and
confusion ultimately raise the question to what extent it is possible to con-
sider specific forms of protection for a migratory process that does not have
a clearly established “cause.”
But the problem of multi-causality should not be an excuse to ignore
the necessity of developing a protection framework for climate-induced
displacement.472 Even the existing refugee structure itself “is not immune
from this causal complexity.”473 Indeed, it is impractical to assess each
individual against the Refugee Convention definition of a refugee, espe-
cially in cases involving massive numbers of forced migrants.474 Instead,
the current refugee framework, including UNHCR and other international
organizations, treats a large number of people who flee their homes be-
cause of persecution, war, and famine as “persons of concern” and extends
protection and assistance.475
Given the uncertainty in predicting exact numbers of climate
change displacement and the problem of multi-causality of environmental
displacement, national governments and the international community
should develop norms and a framework for the protection of the rights
465 See Williams, supra note 67, at 506.
466 STEVE LONERGAN & ASHOK SWAIN, AVISO, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND
POPULATION DISPLACEMENT 2 (1999).
467 Burton & Hodgkinson, supra note 274, at 3.
468 Inter-Agency Standing Comm., supra note 180, at1; KOLMANNSKOG, supra note 40, at15.
469 See KOLMANNSKOG, supra note 272, at 5.
470 See Burton & Hodgkinson, supra note 274, at 6.
471 See, e.g., BOANO ET AL., supra note 95, at 12.
472 See Castles, supra note 410, at 244.
473 CORLETT, supra note 44, at 48.
474 Id. at 48–49.
475 Id. at 49.
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of the environmental migrants.476 Such norms and a framework will help
to build consensus on a specific causal relationship as well as a uniform
definition.477 The framework should also establish a sophisticated institu-
tional architecture to integrate complex issues of causality and evolving
science into decision-making with respect to climate change migration
based on objective, rather than subjective, criteria.478 The international
community, far more crucially, should employ all possible efforts for the
assessment of the capacity of our institutions and normative frameworks
to respond to the needs of the vulnerable.
476 See Roger Zetter, The Role of Legal and Normative Frameworks for the Protection of
Environmentally Displaced People, in FRANK LACZKO & CHRISTINE AGHAZARM, MIGRATION,
ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 395 (2009).
477 See id.
478 See, e.g., David Hodgkinson et al., Copenhagen, Climate Change ‘Refugees’ and the Need
for a Global Agreement, 4 PUB. POL’Y 155, 163 (2009).
